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INTRODUCTION

It is an open question whether the prohibition on employment
discrimination in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects
plaintiffs who have not attempted to mitigate the effect of their
disability on their ability to work. Suppose, for example, that a job
applicant has severely impaired vision because of a corneal disease.1

* Associate Professor, University of Chicago Law School; Visiting Associate Professor,
Vanderbilt University Law School. B.A. 1994, J.D. 1997, Yale University. - Ed. I would
like to thank Samuel Bagenstos, Jack Balkin, Michael Berube, Adrienne Davis, Elizabeth
Emens, Allan Erbsen, Leslie Francis, Ann Hubbard, Jerry Mashaw, Carol Rose, Anita
Silvers, Aviam Soifer, Michael Stein, Geoffrey Stone, Cass Sunstein, and the participants in
faculty workshops at the Northwestern University School of Law, the sixth annual meeting
of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, and the 2003 annual
meeting of the Law and Society Association. The University of Chicago Law Library
provided excellent research assistance. The Lee and Brena Freeman Faculty Research Fund
and the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund contributed financial support. © 2004, Jill
Elaine Hasday.

1. See, e.g. , Yaron s. Rabinowitz, Keratoconus, 42 SURV . OPHTHALMOLOGY 297, 298-99
(1998) ("Keratoconus is a condition in which the cornea assumes a conical shape as a result
of noninflammatory thinning of the corneal stroma. The corneal thinning induces irregular
astigmatism, myopia, and protrusion, leading to mild to marked impairment in the quality of
vision. It is a progressive disorder ultimately affecting both eyes . . . . ) (footnote omitted);
Karla Zadnik et al., Biomicroscopic Signs and Disease Severity in Keratoconus, 15 CORNEA
139, 139 (1996) ("Keratoconus is characterized by symptoms of visual distortion, observable
"
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He can have corneal transplant surgery that his doctors recommend
and expect will allow him to see much more clearly,2 but he does not
want to have the surgery because of the complications sometimes
associated with the operation and the possibility that the surgery will
not work.3 He applies for a job that has been structured for people
who can see clearly and asks the employer to purchase work
equipment (like a new computer) that will enable him to perform the
job with limited eyesight. Purchasing this equipment will be costly, and
the employer asks why it should have to bear those costs when the
applicant could have surgery to enable him to see better.
The question raises a core issue of rights and responsibilities under
a civil rights law. But Title I of the ADA,4 which protects "a qualified
individual with a disability" from employment discrimination based on
his disability,5 never indicates whether there is a duty to mitigate,
either by undergoing medical procedures, using medication, pursuing
physical therapy, losing weight, abstaining from alcohol and cigarettes,
or taking other measures to improve health and eliminate obstacles to
employment. The Supreme Court has not yet considered the question,
and legal commentators have all but ignored it.6 The few lower courts
corneal irregularity that steepens with time, classic slit-lamp biomicroscopic signs (Vogt's
striae and Fleischer's ring), and progressive corneal scarring.") (citation omitted}.
2. See, e.g. , Kurt A. Buzard & Bradley R. Fundingsland, Corneal Transplant for
Keratoconus: Results in Early and Late Disease, 23 J. CATARACT & REFRACTIVE SURGERY
398, 405 (1997) ("(T]he results of this study indicate that . . . corneal transplantation (is] the
primary choice for permanently eliminating visual problems in eyes with early and moderate
keratoconus."); Rabinowitz, supra note 1, at 315 ("Corneal transplant (penetrating
keratoplasty) is the best and most successful surgical option for keratoconus patients who
cannot tolerate contact lenses or are not adequately visually rehabilitated by them. Central
scarring may preclude good vision from contact lenses, even when they are tolerated."}.
3. See, e.g. , M.L. Chipman et al., Changing Risk for Early Transplant Failure: Data from
the Ontario Corneal Recipient Registry, 28 CANADIAN J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 254, 254 (1993)
("To examine the joint effects of donor, recipient and surgical characteristics on the risk of
early corneal transplant failure, 73 cases of early failure (no period of clarity or clarity lasting
no more than 28 days) reported to the Ontario Corneal Recipient Registry were compared
with 1591 control transplants remaining clear for 6 months or more. In logistic regression
models donor age was significantly associated with graft failure, with the odds of failure
increasing by 24% per decade. In recipients with a history of cataract or glaucoma or with an
intraocular lens in place the relative odds of failure ranged from 2.16 to 3.08. Among surgical
factors, larger grafts increased risk by 45% per 0.25 mm."); Rabinowitz, supra note 1, at 315
("Because of the avascular nature of the cornea, corneal transplant has a success rate of 9396% . . . . Complete visual recovery may, however, take as long as 6 months. Patients who are
candidates for penetrating keratoplasty should be counseled that in spite of the high success
rate of surgery there is still a 50% chance that they may need contact lenses, either because
of residual myopia or postkeratoplasty astigmatism."); id. at 316 ("In compliant patients,
complications after penetrating keratoplasty are rare. These may include rejection,
postoperative astigmatism, a fixed dilated pupil, and recurrence of keratoconus.").
4. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
5. Id. § 12112(a).
6. For a discussion of the sparse existing literature, see infra note 54 and accompanying
text.
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to address a duty to mitigate under Title I are divided on whether
mitigation should be required,7 and those in favor of the duty have not
developed a clear standard for when that duty should apply.8 To the
extent that the decisions supporting a duty to mitigate imply any
principle for implementing the duty, most appear to suggest that Title
I plaintiffs are obligated to mitigate whenever mitigation is possible. I
reject both extremes of the existing debate. This Article argues that
plaintiffs seeking Title I protection should be under a duty to mitigate,
but that this duty should require plaintiffs to pursue only those
mitigating measures that could reduce their need for workplace
accommodation and that a reasonable person in the same situation
would pursue.
The question of whether, when, and why there is a duty to mitigate
under Title I of the ADA is important both doctrinally and
theoretically, and courts enforcing Title I will inevitably have to decide
it. Employer-defendants are beginning to press the issue, and existing
ADA case law-combined with tort jurisprudence, medical literature,
and disabled people's own accounts-makes clear that some people do
not mitigate their disabilities when mitigation is possible.
First, many disabled people do not want to bear the risks or side
effects associated with some mitigating procedures. These risks and
side effects range from the very serious to the less so. The failure rates
for mitigating measures vary widely. The side effects associated with
mitigation may be mild, but may also entail permanent neurological
damage, impaired memory, impaired cognitive function, dulled
creativity, aggressive behavior, hyperactivity, tremors, seizures,
7. For cases holding that courts will consider only mitigation that the plaintiff has
undertaken, see Nawrot v. CPC Int'!, 277 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 2002); Williams v.
Thresholds, Inc., No. 02 C 9101, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2003); EEOC v. Voss
Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1358 & n.2 (W.D. Okla. 2003); Bertinetti v. Joy Mining
Mach., 231 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833-34 (S.D. Ill. 2002); Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65
F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037 (D. Ariz. 1999); infra note 53 and accompanying text. For a case
holding that a failure to mitigate reduces the plaintiff's damage award, but does not defeat
the plaintiff's claim, see Capizzi v. County of Placer, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1 105, 1 1 12-13 (E.D. Cal.
2001); infra note 53 and accompanying text. For cases holding or suggesting that plaintiffs
are under a duty to mitigate, see cases cited infra note 8. For a case in which the defendant
raised the duty to mitigate issue, but the court did not reach it, see Fraser v. United States
Bancorp, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193 (D. Or. 2001).
8. For cases finding a duty to mitigate, see Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ. 7393
(AKH), slip op. at 7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003); Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp.
2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Rose v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614 (D.
Md. 2002); Hewitt v. Akan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001);
Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354
(4th Cir. 2000) (mem.); infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. For cases that seem to
suggest, less clearly, that there is a duty to mitigate, see Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth.,
181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1999); Mont-Ros v. City of West Miami, 1 1 1 F. Supp. 2d 1338,
1356-57 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Llante v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 3091, slip op. at
12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1999); Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232-33
(D. Kan. 1999); Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937 F. Supp. 541, 548 (E.D. Va.
1996); infra notes 69, 71 and accompanying text.
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blurred vision, hypothyroidism, blood disorders, liver damage,
sedation, sleep disturbances, sexual dysfunction, weight gain, birth
defects for one's children, pain, or death.9
Second, some disabled people are unable or unwilling to avoid
practices and conditions-like smoking, drinking alcohol, or being
substantially overweight-that harm their overall health and can
intensify the consequences of their disabilities. District courts have
already considered Title I suits brought by a plaintiff who did not stop
smoking when his doctor advised him that smoking aggravated his
respiratory problems,10 by a plaintiff who did not abstain from alcohol
and start exercising when her doctor advised her that doing so would
help control her diabetes,11 and by a plaintiff who did not lose weight
when his doctors advised him that weight loss would alleviate his sleep
apnea.12 More cases like these are certain to arise.
Third, some disabled people are unable to afford some, or any,
mitigating measures. The jurisprudence on people injured by tort, for
example, reveals disabled people unable to pay for surgery that
Medicaid would not cover,13 unable to pay for surgery that their health
insurance would not cover,14 unable to pay for surgery because they
had no health insurance,15 and unable to take time off from work so
that an injury could heal because they had no disability insurance to
support them in the interim.16
Fourth, some disabled people, members of the deaf community
most prominent among them, publicly state that they do not attempt
to mitigate because they understand their disabilities to be central to
their cultural identities. Cochlear implant surgery, for example, has
enabled some deaf people to process sounds well enough to
understand speech.17 Other deaf people, however, refuse the surgery,
not because of its considerable risks and limitations,18 but because they
believe that their deafness is a crucial part of who they are. A
president of the National Association of the Deaf, for instance, has

9. See infra text accompanying notes 72-104.
10. See Rose, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 614-15, 614 n.7.
11. See Fraser, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1 191.
12. See Mont-Ros, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1346, 1356.
13. See McGee v. Jones, 499 S.E.2d 398, 400-01 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
14. See Seagers v. Pailet, 656 So. 2d 700, 713-14 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
15. See Gunn v. Robertson, 801 So. 2d 555, 561 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Dunn v. Maxey, 693
N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
16. See Etheredge v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 814 So. 2d 1 19, 121-23 (La. Ct. App.
2002).
17. See infra text accompanying note 72.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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expressed such sentiments: '"I'm happy with who I am,"' she has
declared, "'and I don't want to be 'fixed. ""19
In addition to the practical urgency of resolving the duty to
mitigate question, examining the issue of whether there is a duty to
mitigate under Title I also casts new light on an important debate in
the Title I case law and scholarship about the extent of the differences
between Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."20 The traditional view in this debate,
advanced by many courts21 and commentators,22 holds that Title I and

19. Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture,
Roslyn Rosen).

ATLANTIC,

Sept. 1993, at 37, 38 (quoting

20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
21. See, e.g. , Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. & Univs. for Northeastern Ill.
Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Title I of the ADA, by contrast [with, inter alia,
Title VII], requires employers to consider and to accommodate disabilities, and in the
process extends beyond the anti-discrimination principle."); Harter v. Univ. of Indianapolis,
5 F. Supp. 2d 657, 661 (S.D. Ind. 1998) ("Unlike other federal employment discrimination
laws (including Title VII], the ADA does not simply forbid discrimination on a particular
basis. The ADA imposes an affirmative duty on employers to provide 'reasonable
accommodations' for a disabled employee.") (citations omitted); Dunlap v. Ass'n of Bay
Area Gov'ts, 996 F. Supp. 962, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("(T]he analogy between race and
gender discrimination claims brought under Title VII and disability discrimination claims
brought under the ADA is extremely limited. In an action for race or gender discrimination,
a plaintiff must prove that she was treated differently from those similarly situated because
of a protected characteristic. In contrast, under the ADA, a person with a disability need not
prove that she was treated differently from non-disabled individuals. Discrimination may be
shown precisely where the defendant treated plaintiff the same as everyone around her,
despite her need for reasonable accommodation.") (citation omitted).
22 See, e.g. , Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) ("(U]nder the civil rights statutes that
protect women, blacks, or older workers, plaintiffs can complain of discrimination against
them, but they cannot insist upon discrimination in their favor; disabled individuals often
can.") (footnote omitted); id. at 9 ("(T]he ADA declares it illegal to deny an individual an
employment opportunity by failing to take account of her disability when taking account of
it-in the sense of changing the job or physical environment of the workplace-would
enable her to do the work. This is a far different definition of 'discrimination' than the
definition embraced in other areas of employment discrimination law. Title VII, for instance,
essentially takes jobs as it finds them . . . . The failure to undertake positive steps to revamp
the job or the environment does not constitute discrimination."); Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for
Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-4 (2000) ("The ADA
incorporated a profoundly different model of equality from that associated with traditional
non-discrimination statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Those statutes, for
the most part, were geared toward achieving only formal equality: equal treatment of
similarly situated individuals. . . . The ADA required not only that disabled individuals be
treated no worse than non-disabled individuals with whom they were similarly situated, but
also directed that in certain contexts they be treated differently, arguably better, to achieve
an equal effect.") (footnotes omitted); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable
Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1199-1200 (2003)
("The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) differs fundamentally from Title
VII. . . . The central thrust of Title VII employs a 'sameness' model of discrimination,
requiring employers to treat African Americans and women exactly the same as others; their
race and sex must be ignored and employers must focus instead on factors related to
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Title VII are fundamentally different because Title I imposes
significant costs on employers, while Title VII does not. This argument
emphasizes that Title I has a reasonable accommodation provision
that Title VII lacks. That provision requires an employer to provide a
disabled employee or job applicant who cannot perform a job as it is
currently structured with reasonable accommodations that alter the
job so that the disabled person can fill it,23 unless the employer "can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of [its] business. "24 The traditionalists
contend that this requirement places great costs on employers and that
employers bear no equivalent burden under Title VII. More recently,
a group of revisionists, led by Christine Jolls, has argued that the
traditional view overstates the differences between Title I and Title
VII.25 The revisionists ·note that Title VII also imposes costs on
employers, including costs resulting from the statute's prohibition on
intentional discrimination or " disparate treatment." For instance, Title
VII forces employers to adopt nondiscriminatory hiring practices that
may alienate prejudiced customers and coworkers who want to
interact only with employees who have particular demographic
characteristics.26 Title VII also prohibits employers from making
productivity. Although the ADA uses a sameness model in part, its distinctive thrust is a
'difference' model, requiring employers to treat individuals with disabilities differently and
more favorably than others. Employers must treat individuals with disabilities as qualified if
they 'can perform the essential functions' of the job. Empl.oyers are free to treat others as
qualified only if they can perform all of the functions of the job. Similarly, employers must
make 'reasonable accommodations' for individuals with disabilities. Sometimes these
accommodations may be expensive or require significant alterations in the way a job is
structured. Yet neither Title VII nor the ADA require employers to make these
accommodations for others. ") (footnotes omitted).
23.

See 42 U.S. C.§§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(9) (2000).

24.

Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).

25. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV.642,
645 (2001) ("[I]n a broader respect than has generally been appreciated, some aspects of
antidiscrimination Jaw - in particular its disparate impact branch - are in fact
requirements of accommodation. In such instances it is hard to resist the conclusion that
antidiscrimination and accommodation are overlapping rather than fundamentally distinct
categories, despite the frequent claims of commentators to the contrary. ... [E]ven those
aspects of antidiscrimination Jaw that are not in fact accommodation requirements in the
sense just described are similar to accommodation requirements in respects that have not
previously been understood. ").
26. See id. at 645, 686-87; see a lso Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination,
Accommodation and Universal Mandates -Aren't They All the Same?, 24 BERKELEY J.EMP.
& LAB. L. 111, 125-26 (2003) ("Title VII ... bans employers from refusing to hire male

candidates for a flight attendant position, even when the employer contends that the policy
is driven by monetary considerations of aligning the profile of the flight attendant with
customer preferences. Even where it is profitable, however, employers must refrain from
engaging in sex discrimination.... This duty to incur costs to avoid Title VII liability
resembles the costs employers incur accommodating certain groups under accommodation
mandates. In both cases, employers must abandon the profit maximizing calculus in favor of
inclusion of members of protected groups. ") (footnote omitted).
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employment decisions based on statistically accurate generalizations
about a protected class.27
Both the traditional and the revisionist accounts of the differences
between Title I and Title VII focus, however, on the quantitative or
monetary costs that each statute imposes on employers.28 What both
sides of this debate miss, and what the duty to mitigate issue helps
highlight, is that considering solely quantitative or monetary costs
overlooks one of the most important differences between Title I and
Title VII: that Title l's reasonable accommodation provision and Title
VIl's prohibition on intentional discrimination attribute different
moral or normative weight to the costs that they impose on employers.
Title VII's disparate treatment jurisprudence accords no moral or
normative weight to the costs that an employer may incur from hiring
members of a protected class; it operates on the assumption that these
costs give an employer no legitimate cause for complaint. Title VII
recognizes no valid justification, including cost, for employment
decisions based on race or color. The statute identifies one situation
where employers can legitimately make employment decisions based

27. See Jolls, supra note 25, at 645, 686-87; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational
Discrimination, " Accommodation , and the Politics of (Disability ) Civil Righ ts, 89 VA. L.

REV. 825, 832 (2003) ("(A]ccommodation requirements represent nothing more than a
specific example of the general prohibition of rational discrimination-a prohibition that is
well entrenched in the Jaw (including Title VII]. "); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination ,
Stigma, and "Disability, " 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 457 (2000) (hereinafter Bagenstos,
Subordination ] ("(D]iscrimination on the basis of the forbidden classifications is frequently
rational for the discriminator, but the civil rights laws (including Title VII] prohibit it
anyway. ") (footnote omitted); Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 833, 846 (2001) ("Title VII sometimes permits cost-saving statistical discrimination
and sometimes fo rbids it: When it forbids it,I believe it is demanding accommodation. ").
In addition, Title VII prevents an employer from using a facially-neutral policy that has
a disparate impact on a protected class if the employer "fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity, " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000), or if the plaintiff "show[s] that other
selection devices without a similar discriminatory effect would also serve the employer's
legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship," Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Jolls, supra note 25,at
652-66.
28. See, e.g. , Jolls, supra note 25, at 685-86 ("The point is the way in which prohibitions
on discrimination based upon customer or coworker attitudes or upon correct employer
beliefs about a particular group impose financial costs on employers, much as do
accommodation requirements."); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 22, at 24 ("(A]n
efficiency rationale ... cannot explain the ADA's requirement of reasonable
accommodation. The signal from a genuine disability is not wholly spurious.... An
individual who is limited in a 'major life activity' might well be limited in some aspect of a
given job. Less obviously, even if many disabled workers would not be limited with respect
to a particular job, employers still might incur higher costs to accurately assess the
productivity of the disabled than other applicants for employment. Even before the passage
of the ADA, some employers found such expenditures to be profitable and hired the
disabled,but it hardly follows, after the enactment of the ADA, that all employers now find
such expenditures to be profitable. If the innovations required by the ADA were generally
efficient, they would have been more widely adopted without its enactment.") (footnote
omitted).
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on religion, sex, or national origin, namely, "those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise."29 But as the Supreme Court has
emphasized, this is a singular,30 and "extremely narrow exception,"31 in
which cost is not a valid reason for refusing to employ a protected
person. "The extra cost of employing members of one sex," for
instance, is not sufficient to defend sex-based hiring practices under
Title VII.32 Title VII's prohibition on intentional discrimination may
impose costs on employers, as the revisionists note, but the Title VII
jurisprudence assumes that this gives employers no rightful ground for
complaint because these costs reflect the moral and normative goals of
the statute.
In contrast, Title I's reasonable accommodation provision
recognizes that employers can have legitimate grounds to complain
about the costs of accommodation, that these are costs that employers
can legitimately seek to minimize, and that efforts to minimize the
costs of accommodation are not merely a form of prejudice.33 This is
an important difference, and it suggests a powerful reason to impose a
duty to mitigate on people asking for reasonable accommodation
under Title I. One strong reason that people seeking the protection of
Title I's reasonable accommodation provision should have a duty to
mitigate is that employers can legitimately expect employees and job
applicants to m1mmize the difficulty and expense of the
accommodations that the employees and applicants require. As the
statute recognizes, employers have a legitimate interest in reducing
these costs.
If the duty to mitigate issue helps cast light on the debate over the
differences between Title I and Title VII, a second debate in the Title
I scholarship casts light back on the duty to mitigate question. This
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (emphasis added).
30. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 242 (1989) (plurality opinion)
("Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into
account in making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a 'bona fide
occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of th[e]
particular business or enterprise.' The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is
that, in all other circumstances, a person's gender may not be considered in making decisions
that affect her.") (citation omitted).
31. Dothard v.Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 334 (1977); see a lso VAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 201 (1991) ("The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has
read it narrowly.").
32.

Johnson Controls, Inc. , 499 U. S. at 210.

33. Title I also prohibits intentional discrimination against a disabled job applicant or
employee who can perform the job in question as it is currently structured. See 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (2000). Like Title VII, Title I assumes that an employer has no legitimate cause to
complain about the costs of abandoning intentional discrimination. See infra text
accompanying notes 168-75, 184.
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second debate revolves around whether Title I's reasonable
accommodation provision has had negative employment effects on
disabled people, meaning that the costs that the reasonable
accommodation prov1s1on imposes on employers have made
employers less willing to hire disabled people than the employers were
before Title I was enacted. There is at least some evidence to support
the view that Title I's reasonable accommodation provision has had
negative employment effects, although the issue remains contested.34
If Title I's reasonable accommodation provision has had negative
employment effects, then imposing a duty to mitigate on disabled
people seeking reasonable accommodation, which might seem to
disadvantage disabled people, could actually help them by reducing
the costs that employing disabled people places on employers and thus
increasing employers' willingness to hire the disabled. Imposing a duty
to mitigate could also help disabled people, even if Title I's reasonable
accommodation provision has not had negative employment effects. It
may be the case, for instance, that the enactment of Title I has
increased employers' willingness to hire disabled people, because
employers' fears of being sued under the statute for not hiring
disabled people outweigh their reluctance to assume the costs of
accommodation. An employer in this position would presumably be
even more willing to hire disabled people if the cost of accommodating
them was reduced.
This Article aims to contribute, then, both to the resolution of a
hard doctrinal problem and to a deeper understanding of Title I and
its place within the law of employment discrimination.35 Part I argues
that the Supreme Court (or, better yet, Congress) should find a duty
to mitigate under Title I of the ADA. Part II explains why this
obligation should take the specific form of a duty of reasonable
mitigation. The duty of reasonable mitigation I propose would require
Title I plaintiffs to undertake those mitigating measures that could
34. See infra note 63.
35. I take as a starting point the fact that the ADA exists and is being enforced. I do not
consider whether the ADA should have been enacted, whether the ADA should now be
repealed, or how the ADA would compare to a social insurance scheme. For commentary
discussing those questions, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 494 (1992) ("The ADA fares no better
than other forms of antidiscrimination laws, and perhaps worse. It too should be repealed,
whether or not some subsidy for disabled persons is retained. "); Ruth Colker, The Death of
Section 504, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 219 (2001 /2002) ("The passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a significant and positive development for the law of
disability discrimination.") (footnote omitted); Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 231 (1994) ("I agree, therefore, with Richard Epstein that the
ADA is a deeply-flawed statute. I do not, however, agree that the remedy is repeal. Or, to
put the matter more precisely, I do not agree that we should return to a regime in which our
disability policy consists entirely of pensioning people out of the work force and providing
some extremely modest efforts at increasing the supply of 'able' workers through
rehabilitation, vocational counseling, and the like.").
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reduce their need for accommodation and that would be undertaken
by a reasonable person in the same situation-meaning, at the least, a
reasonable person with the same condition, the same mitigating
measures available, and the same financial resources for treatment.
This duty would reject both of the extreme positions that currently
dominate the lower court opinions considering the duty to mitigate.
One set of these opinions finds no duty to mitigate, while the other
generally suggests that Title I plaintiffs are obligated to mitigate
whenever mitigation is possible. In contrast, the duty of reasonable
mitigation that I advocate would be limited to mitigation that could
reduce a plaintiff's need for accommodation because this is the
mitigation that could serve an employer's legitimate interest in
minimizing the expense and difficulty that can be associated with
providing accommodation. If mitigation could not lessen a plaintiff's
need for accommodation, either because the plaintiff already requires
no accommodation or because the mitigation could not have a large
enough impact on the plaintiff's disability, the duty of reasonable
mitigation would not require the plaintiff to mitigate. The duty of
reasonable mitigation would also be limited to mitigation that a
reasonable person in the same situation would undertake because
plaintiffs can have legitimate cause not to mitigate in some
circumstances. The duty of reasonable mitigation would obligate a
Title I plaintiff to assume only those risks and side effects that a
reasonable person would assume to eliminate or ameliorate the
condition in question, to follow only those measures to improve
overall health that a reasonable person with the same condition would
follow, and to shoulder only those financial costs associated with
mitigation that a reasonable person with the same financial means
would shoulder. Courts should not find the standard of reasonable
mitigation too difficult to administer because judges and juries have
significant experience with applying similar standards of reasonable
mitigation in many legal contexts, including cases about torts, workers'
compensation, Social Security .disability benefits, and private disability
insurance policies.
Requiring plaintiffs to undertake reasonable mitigation should
resolve the vast bulk of Title I cases raising the duty to mitigate issue. I
also contend, moreover, that the reasonable mitigation standard can
appropriately resolve two particularly hard categories of cases. The
first involves disabled people who do not want to assume a serious risk
or side effect associated with mitigation that a reasonable person in
the same situation would assume. The second involves the small
number of disabled people who do not mitigate even when a
reasonable person would because they understand their disability to
be central to their cultural identity. Both cases involve disabled people
who have made unreasonable decisions against mitigation in situations
where reasonable mitigation would involve particularly significant
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sacrifices, at least from the perspective of the disabled person in
question. I conclude, however, that disabled people in these difficult
situations should still be subject to the duty of reasonable mitigation.
The same arguments for imposing a duty to mitigate on other Title I
plaintiffs apply here as well. And establishing a separate legal
standard, outside of the reasonable mitigation standard, to govern
these hard cases would foster endless disputes about when each of the
two standards should apply.
Yet these difficult categories of cases illustrate that judges and
juries should proceed cautiously before concluding that a plaintiff's
decision against mitigation is unreasonable. Empirical data about the
behavior of other disabled people in the plaintiff's situation is an
important source of information that fact finders can rely upon in
making the judgment that a plaintiff has acted unreasonably. The
more disabled people in the plaintiff's situation who decide to
mitigate, the more evidence there is that mitigation is the only
reasonable choice. At the same time, the fact that most people in a
certain situation have mitigated should not always compel the
conclusion that the people who make the other decision are
unreasonable. In some situations, the sacrifice associated with
mitigation may be large enough, or the costs and benefits of mitigation
sufficiently matched, that decisions both for and against mitigation are
reasonable, even if a majority of people in the plaintiff's situation
choose to mitigate. For this reason, courts should not automatically
and immediately equate reasonableness with majority rule. It is worth
the effort for courts to evaluate the reasonableness of a plaintiff's
conduct carefully, considering to the extent possible not only how
many people in the plaintiff's situation have mitigated or not, but why
they have acted as well. A more cautious approach would help
safeguard a plaintiff's most important legitimate interests, justifying its
somewhat greater demands on the capacity of fact finders.
Part III briefly examines the legal rights of people who have
mitigated in light of the duty of reasonable mitigation that I advocate
imposing. It argues that the duty to mitigate should be paired with
greater protections for mitigators. For obvious reasons, a person who
remains substantially limited in a major life activity even after
reasonable mitigation is protected under Title I and entitled to
reasonable accommodations. This person has taken reasonable efforts
to minimize his need for accommodation, but is still disabled and in
potential need of accommodation. I argue, however, that a plaintiff
should also be protected from intentional discrimination (although not
entitled to accommodation) as a "regarded as" disabled person under
Title I if he has no substantial limitations after mitigating, but suffers
an adverse employment action because he had to mitigate or because
of the (non-substantially-limiting) side effects of the mitigation.
Protecting these two classes of mitigators from intentional
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discrimination would advance legitimate interests under Title I,
without impinging upon the legitimate interests of employers.
Part IV uses the duty to mitigate issue to illuminate a key
difference between Title I and Title VII. It argues that Title VII
should impose no duty to mitigate, despite the advantages of placing
such an obligation on people seeking the protection of Title l's
reasonable accommodation provision. Placing a duty to mitigate on
Title VII plaintiffs-which the Title VII jurisprudence formally does
not do but arguably might be doing indirectly-would allow employers
to avoid costs that reflect the very bias the statute seeks to condemn.
But imposing a duty to mitigate on plaintiffs seeking the protection of
Title l's accommodation provision would serve what the statute
recognizes as legitimate interests.
I.

THE CASE FOR IMPOSING A DUTY TO MITIGATE ON PLAINTIFFS
SEEKING THE PROTECTION OF TITLE I'S REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION PROVISION

The first question to ask in thinking about the duty to mitigate
issue under Title I is whether Title I establishes such a duty. If Title l's
statutory text answers that question, the status of the duty to mitigate
is settled. If the text is unclear, one needs to look elsewhere for
guidance. As we will see, the case for imposing a duty to mitigate on
plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title l's reasonable
accommodation provision focuses on policy considerations because
the statutory text is indeterminate on the issue of mitigation.
The ADA defines " 'disability"' as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or ( C)
being regarded as having such an impairment. "36 Title I defines a
"'qualified individual with a disability"' as "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position."37 Title I
prohibits intentional employment discrimination "against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability."38 It also entitles a
qualified disabled job applicant or employee to "reasonable
accommodations" that alter a job so that the disabled person can
perform it,39 unless the employer can establish that those

36. 42 u.s.c. § 12102(2).
37. Id. § 12111(8).
38. Id. § 12112(a).
39. Id. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(9).
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accommodations "would impose an undue hardship" on the
employer.40
This statutory scheme does not indicate whether there is a duty to
mitigate. Consider, for example, the job applicant described in the
introduction who needs work equipment for the visually impaired
because his vision is severely limited, and he has refused an operation
that could allow him to see much more clearly.41 This applicant would
certainly count as disabled if he needed equipment for the visually
impaired because his severely limited eyesight could not be treated.
This applicant would certainly not count as disabled if he needed
equipment for the visually impaired because he had made an arbitrary
decision to wear a blindfold despite having fully functional vision. In
fact, however, this applicant cannot see clearly by simply removing a
blindfold, but he can do something to see clearly. Title I's text just
does not address whether he has an obligation to reduce or eliminate
his disability if he can. It is similarly silent on the obligations of a
plaintiff who could control her diabetes much more effectively if she
lost weight, exercised, modified her diet, and had surgery to combat
the deterioration of her vision,42 or a plaintiff who could control his
manic depression much more effectively if he took lithium and
underwent psychological counseling.43
Faced with this textual indeterminacy, some of the few lower
courts and commentators to consider whether Title I imposes a duty to

40. Id. § 12112(b )(5)(A).
41. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
42. See, e.g. , Marion J. Franz et al., Nutrition Principles for the Management of Diabetes
and Related Complications, 17 DIABETES CARE 490, 491 (1994) ("For obese persons with
type II diabetes mellitus, moderate weight loss irrespective of starting weight has been
shown to reduce hyperglycemia, dyslipidemia, and hypertension. "); J6hannes Kari
Kristinsson, Diabetic Retinopathy: Screening and Prevention of Blindness, 75 ACT A
OPHTHALMOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 1, 9 ( Supp. 1997) ("In recent years laser treatment has
been introduced that can significantly decrease the likelihood of blindness in diabetic
patients, if the eyes are treated at the appropriate stage of the disease. "); Madelyn L.
Wheeler, Nutrition Management and Physical Activity as Treatments for Diabetes, 26
PRIMARY CARE 857, 857 (1999) ("Diabetes is essentially a self-management disease. For
people with type 1 diabetes, nutrition and physical activity recommendations are integrated
with blood glucose monitoring and an insulin regimen. For people with type 2 diabetes, this
means integrating blood glucose monitoring with nonpharmacological therapy (nutrition
management and physical activity). If necessary, pharmacologic therapy (oral agents or
insulin) enters into the equation also. "); Shelby R. Wilkes, Current Therapy of Diabetic
Retinopathy: Laser and Vitreoretinal Surgery, 85 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 841, 846 (1993) ("The
advent of laser surgery and pars plana vitreous surgery has enhanced the vision and
improved the lifestyle of the diabetic patient."); supra text accompanying note 11.
43. See, e.g. , Margaret M. Rea et al., Family -Focused Treatment Versus Individual
Treatment for Bipolar Disorder: Results ofa Randomi zed Clinical Trial, 71 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 482, 482 (2003) ("Results suggest that family psychoeducational
treatment is a useful adjunct to pharmacotherapy in decreasing the risk of relapse and
hospitalization frequently associated with bipolar disorder."); infra text accompanying notes
78-85.
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mitigate have attempted to resolve the issue by extrapolating from an
argument about the ADA's text that appeared in a Supreme Court
opinion, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. ,44 on another issue. But this
effort is unconvincing.
Sutton and two companion cases decided in 1999 considered the
status of Title I plaintiffs who have mitigated their disabilities.45 The
duty to mitigate was not at issue in Sutton, and none of the Sutton
opinions addressed it, because the Sutton plaintiffs had already
mitigated. These plaintiffs had severe myopia, but they wore
corrective lenses that allowed them to see 20/20 or better.46 They sued
United Airlines under Title I after the airline refused to hire them as
commercial airline pilots because they could not satisfy the airline's
requirement that its pilots have uncorrected vision of 20/100 or
better.47 The Sutton case raised the question of whether the plaintiffs
counted as disabled or "regarded as" disabled people now that they
had mitigated. The Court held that if a plaintiff is no longer
substantially limited in any maj or life activity after mitigating, she does
not count as a disabled person for purposes of Title 1.48 Sutton also
held that a plaintiff is not protected under Title I as someone who is
"regarded as" disabled unless she can demonstrate that the employer
defendant acted because it thought that the plaintiff had an
impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.49 On this
holding, the Sutton plaintiffs were not protected under Title I because
their sight was not substantially limited with the corrective lenses that
they wore in place and because there was insufficient evidence that
United Airlines thought that the plaintiffs were substantially limited.50
One argument that the Sutton Court made in reaching its
conclusions contended that the use of the present tense in the ADA's
definition of disability, where "the phrase 'substantially limits' appears
in the Act in the present indicative verb form,"51 helped establish that
a plaintiff who has mitigated should be evaluated in her current,
mitigated state for purposes of determining whether she is a disabled

44. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
45. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
46. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
47. See id. at 475-76.
48. See id. at 475, 482, 488; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
Sutton holds that an individual does count as a disabled person under Title I "if,
notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, th(e] individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
49. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521-22.
50. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-93.
51. Id. at 482.
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person covered under Title I.52 Some lower courts53 and
commentators54 have extrapolated from this part of Sutton to assert
52. See id. at 482-83.
53. See Nawrot v. CPC Int'J, 277 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[I]n applying the statute
to specific impairments, courts may consider only the limitations of an individual that persist
after taking into account mitigation measures . . . . This is not, however, license for courts to
meander in 'would, could, or should-have' land. We consider only the measures actually
taken and consequences that actually follow. C f Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-84 .... Those who
discriminate take their victims as they find them."); Williams v. Thresholds, Inc., No. 02 C
9101, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2003) ("Threshold argues that because Williams
could have taken prednisone, and that in fact when he later took prednisone he felt much
better, he was not disabled for ADA purposes. This misconstrues Sutton . The Sutton court
explicitly stated that courts should not engage in counter-factual hypothesizing, guessing
whether a course of treatment would have alleviated a plaintiff's disability.") (citation
omitted); Bertinetti v. Joy Mining Mach., 231 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833-34 (S.D. Ill. 2002) ("[T]he
defendant urges the Court to consider that Bertinetti's condition might have been improved
if he had utilized additional corrective devices. Sutton, however, does not give courts a
license to 'meander in 'would, could, or should-have' land.' Courts should only consider
mitigating steps actually taken and the consequences that actually followed. Accordingly,
this court will not speculate about what Bertinetti's condition would be if he had taken
additional steps to improve his condition.") (citations omitted); Capizzi v. County of Placer,
135 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2001) ("The conclusion that a failure to mitigate does
not defeat the cause of action is supported by Sutton. There the Court observed that in the
ADA 'the phrase 'substantially limits' appears . . . in the present indicative verb form, ...
[indicating that] the language is properly read as requiring that a person be presently-not
potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability.' It
should follow from the fact that the question of disability addresses plaintiff's current
condition, that the fact that a particular procedure would mitigate the condition cannot
prevent a finding that the plaintiff is presently disabled, though it might effect the damages
awarded upon a finding of liability.") (citation omitted); Finical v. Collections Unlimited,
Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037-38 (D. Ariz. 1999) ("Defendant asserts that, when mitigating
measures are considered, Plaintiff does not have a disability as defined by the ADA ... This
argument fails because the Supreme Court requires a case-by-case analysis of the limitations
an individual faces in his or her current state.").
54. See Debra Burke & Malcolm Abel, Ameliorating Medication and ADA Protection :
Use It and Lose It or Re fuse It and Lose It?, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 785, 811 (2001) ("[T]he
Supreme Court concluded in Sutton that the present indicative verb tense used by Congress
required an individualized inquiry into the actual, not hypothetical, situation of the plaintiff's
condition with respect to the issue of an impairment substantially limiting a major life
activity. Considering how a plaintiff would fare if he or she employed mitigating measures
requires speculation and the consideration of a hypothetical situation, an approach
seemingly rejected by the Court in Sutton.") (footnote omitted); Joshua C. Dickinson, Will
the Supreme Court Allow Employers to Consider Reasonable Mitigating Measures Not
Presently Utili zed by Employees When Determining Whether a "Disability " E xists Under
Section A of the ADA?, 68 UMKC L. REV. 389, 398-99 (2000) ("One thing seems evident
from the trilogy of cases ... ; it is the actual condition that the employee presents herself in
at the time of consideration which is pertinent to the disability inquiry . . . . [T]he Court
placed great emphasis on evaluating the individual in their present state and not some
potential or hypothetical state."); Stephanie A Fishman, Note, Individuals with Disabilities
but Without Mitigating Measures, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 2013, 2033 (2000) ("According to
Sutton, a plaintiff is not to be viewed hypothetically but in her present state, with or without
mitigating measures, to determine whether an impairment is in fact substantially limiting.
Following the literal reasoning in Sutton, however, a plaintiff suffering from an impairment
such as myopia, who did not utilize any corrective devices at the time of the alleged
discrimination, would also be disabled under the ADA because she is currently substantially
limited in the major life activity of seeing. ") (footnotes omitted); Sarah Shaw, Comment,
Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who Do Not Use A vailable
Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 C AL. L. REV. 1981, 2007 (2002) ("[T]he same
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that Title I imposes no duty to mitigate because the use of the present
tense in the ADA's definition of disability establishes that Title I
plaintiffs are to be evaluated based on their current abilities and
limitations, whether they have mitigated or not. There are a number of
reasons to reject this contention, however.
First, even if one wanted to use the present tense in the ADA's
definition of disability to resolve the duty to mitigate issue, one could
not. Suppose that the use of the present tense in the definition of
disability conclusively establishes that Title I plaintiffs are to be
evaluated in their present state. That still would not establish how
courts are to determine a plaintiff's present state. What is the present
condition of a person who has not mitigated but could? Is he simply
someone who is disabled? Or is he best described as someone who is
presently not pursuing reasonable efforts to lessen or eliminate his
disability?
Second, the text suggests no reason to think that one should use
the present tense in the ADA's definition of disability to resolve the
duty to mitigate issue. There is no indication in the statute that the
issue of mitigation should be decided by examining the definition of
disability. It is also hard to characterize Congress as making an
important choice in its decision to use the present tense in defining
disability because it is impossible to imagine Congress using any tense
but the present there. Congress could not have defined disability in the
future tense of "will substantially limit" because that definition would
have necessarily relied on speculation and frequently focused on
irrelevant information. A definition of disability that used the past
tense of "substantially limited" would have similarly missed vital
information, because a plaintiff's present state is always relevant,
regardless of whether there is a duty to mitigate. Consider, for
reasoning that supported the Court's conclusion that mitigating measures must be
considered when an individual is currently using such measures demands the opposite
conclusion with regard to an individual who is not presently using mitigating measures. As
emphasized by the Court, the plain language of the statute indicates that an individual's
impairment should be evaluated in its present state rather than in a hypothetical state where
it 'might, could, or would' be substantially limiting.") (footnote omitted); Christine M.
Tomko, Note, The Economically Disadvantaged and the ADA: Why Economic Need Should
Factor into the Mitigating Measures Disability Analysis, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1033, 1043
(2002) ("Furthermore, in explaining its decision, the Court stated that 'a person must be
presently-not potentially or hypothetically- substantially limited in order to demonstrate
a disability. A disability exists only where an impairment substantially limits, not where it
'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.'
By extension, disability must also exist where the impairment substantially limits the plaintiff
because he cannot afford to take mitigating measures, not where the impairment 'might not,'
'could not,' or 'would not' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures could be taken.'')
(footnote omitted); see also Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 27, at 496 ("The Court's
conclusion seems entirely sound, both as a matter of basic statutory interpretation and as a
means of implementing an antisubordination principle. Showing off its facility with
grammatical categories, the Sutton Court noted one crucial textual point: '[T]he phrase
'substantially limits' appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form."').
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instance, two plaintiffs who have both mitigated, but one still has
substantial limitations and the other does not. Clearly, that present
difference is relevant in determining each plaintiff's rights now that
each has mitigated. The first plaintiff, for example, has a much better
claim to reasonable accommodations because he still has substantial
limitations.ss
In addition, the interpretation of the AD A's definition of disability
that some lower courts and commentators have adopted would lead to
absurd results if applied to the duty to mitigate issue. Imagine, as these
courts and commentators would, that the use of the present tense in
the ADA's definition of disability establishes that plaintiffs who have
mitigated are to be evaluated in their mitigated state, and also
establishes that plaintiffs who have not mitigated are to be evaluated
based on their current abilities and limitations without bearing any
duty to mitigate. On this reading of the statute, Title I would treat
some disabled people more favorably because they have not mitigated
and would accordingly give some disabled people an incentive not to
mitigate their disabilities when they otherwise would. Let's return to
the Sutton plaintiffs, for example. On the reading of Title I that some
lower courts and commentators have adopted, the Sutton plaintiffs
should have rationally opted to discard their corrective lenses before
applying to United Airlines. Discarding their lenses would have meant
that courts would have been required to evaluate the Sutton plaintiffs
in their unmitigated condition and to grant the plaintiffs Title I
protection because their unmitigated eyesight is substantially limited.
Coverage under Title I, in tum, would have given the Sutton plaintiffs
the right, if they were otherwise qualified for the pilot positions they
sought, to demand reasonable accommodations from United Airlines,
accommodations that might have been the same corrective lenses that
the Court deemed to have mitigated the plaintiffs' disability.s6 The
interpretation of the ADA's definition of disability that some lower
courts and commentators have extrapolated from Sutton would create
the absurd situation where a plaintiff could be better off demanding
mitigation as an ADA remedy from an employer rather than
mitigating herself. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
refused to interpret statutory texts literally, even when the texts were

55. See infra text accompanying notes 166-70.
56. Of course, establishing that one is covered under Title I is not the same as proving
that a particular defendant has violated the statute. Even if the Sutton plaintiffs had
established their right to demand reasonable accommodation, United Airlines would not
have had to provide the accommodation if it could "demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). United Airlines might have been able to defend its uncorrected
vision requirement for commercial airline pilots under this standard. See infra text
accompanying note 171.
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clear, if literalism would produce absurd results.57 In this case, the
argument for embracing an absurd result is far weaker because the
text on which the lower courts and commentators have relied is not
clear.
With Title I's statutory text indeterminate on the issue of
mitigation, the case for imposing a duty to mitigate turns on policy
considerations. The strongest argument for placing a duty to mitigate
on plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I's reasonable
accommodation provision is that employers can legitimately expect
employees and job applicants to attempt to lessen or eliminate their
need for accommodation if doing so is both possible and (as
elaborated in Part II) reasonable. Phrased another way, plaintiffs
should not be entitled to accommodation under Title I if they have
refused to avail themselves of reasonable treatment options. As Title I
recognizes, employers have a legitimate interest in minimizing the
"significant difficulty or expense" . that can be associated with
providing accommodations.58 In indicating how a court is to assess
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on an
employer, the statute specifically states that a court should consider
the "cost of the accommodation needed," "the effect on expenses and
resources," and "the impact . . . of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility."59
In fact, there are many reasons to believe that it is legitimate to
seek to minimize the costs of the accommodations that employers
provide under Title I, and that employers' concerns about these costs
cannot be dismissed as a form of bias. Title I contemplates
accommodations ranging from "making existing facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities" to "job restructuring, part-time or modified work
57. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) ("Acceptance of the
Government's new-found reading of § 692 'would produce an absurd and unjust result which
Congress could not have intended."') (citation omitted); United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994) (" Some applications of respondents' position would produce
results that were not merely odd, but positively absurd .. .. We do not assume that Congress,
in passing laws, intended such results."); Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 454 (1989) ("Where the literal reading of a statutory term would 'compel an odd
result,' we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper
scope.") (citation omitted); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989)
("The Rule's plain language commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant in a civil trial
as well as in a criminal trial. But that literal reading would compel an odd result in a case like
this .... No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation
that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary's testimony that it
grants to a civil defendant .... It is unfathomable why a civil plaintiff - but not a civil
defendant - should be subjected to this risk. Thus we agree with the Seventh Circuit that as
far as civil trials are concerned, Rule 609(a)(l) 'can't mean what it says."') (citation
omitted).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
59. Id. § 12111(10)(B).
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schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations. "60 Providing these sorts of accommodations clearly
imposes substantial and quantifiable costs on employers in some cases,
even if debate necessarily persists over the exact magnitude of the
imposed costs because systematic and representative data is
unavailable. The President's Committee on Employment of People
with Disabilities, for instance, surveyed a sample of the employers
who contacted its Job Accommodation Network seeking information
about accommodations between July 1 994 and June 1995. This survey
found that 10% of the 448 reported accommodations cost between
$501 and $1000, 4 % of the accommodations cost between $1001 and
$1500, 4% of the accommodations cost between $1501 and $2000, 9 %
of the accommodations cost between $2001 and $5000, and 4 % of the
accommodations cost more than $5000.61 A study of Sears, Roebuck
from January 1993 to December 1995 found that 10% of the 7 1
accommodations the company provided had direct costs of between
$100 and $499, and 1 % of the accommodations had direct costs of
between $500 and $1000.62
The costs that Title I's reasonable accommodation provision
imposes on employers may also be distributed unevenly between
employers. Title I does not operate like a tax system, in which each
employer shares the social cost of helping the disabled by paying
according to a rubric applied to many employers. If more disabled job
applicants choose to apply to one employer, that employer may
ultimately bear more accommodation costs than an otherwise identical
competitor.
The duty of reasonable mitigation would mean that before an
employer has to accommodate someone-to make changes and to
bear costs-that person has to mitigate his disability-to make
changes and to bear costs-to the extent that this is possible and
reasonable. With this duty in place, employers would have to
accommodate only those disabled people who either cannot change in
ways that could lessen their need for accommodations or have a good
reason not to change.

60. Id. § 12111(9).
61. See President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, Report to
Congress on the Job Accommodation Network 1, 3, 7 (July 26, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
62 See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS,
ROEBUCK AND C O 17 fig.I (1996).
.
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The debate about the possible negative employment effects
associated with Title l's reasonable accommodation prov1s1on
suggests, moreover, that disabled people could also importantly
benefit from a measure that lessened the cost of accommodation.63

63. See supra text accompanying note 34. For arguments that Title l's reasonable
accommodation provision has had negative employment effects, see Daron Acemoglu &
Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?: The Case of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 916-17 (2001) ("The empirical analysis looks at
the employment and wages of disabled and nondisabled workers using data from the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1988-97. . . . The CP S data show a post-ADA decline
in the relative employment of disabled men and women aged 21-39, with no change in
relative wages. The deterioration in the relative employment position of disabled workers
began in 1993 for men and in 1992 for women, the first two years the ADA was in effect.
The results are unchanged by controlling for pre-ADA trends in employment of the disabled
or for the increase in the fraction of people receiving disability insurance and supplemental
security income ( S SI). Together these findings lead us to conclude that the ADA reduced
employment for disabled workers aged 21-39."); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and
Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693, 711
(2000) ("A main goal of the ADA is to increase labor market opportunities for people with
disabilities through its mandate for employer-provided job accommodation and its
antidiscrimination measures. Although the ADA may have increased job accommodation
for and reduced discrimination against people with disabilities, the costs of complying with
the act were large enough to reduce the demand for disabled workers and undo its intended
effects. This paper shows that the enactment of the ADA led to a decrease of 7.2 percentage
points in their relative employment. Moreover, these relative employment declines began as
early as 1990, the year of enactment, and continued to fall through 1995."); id. ("These
results strongly suggest that the employment mandates of the ADA that require firms to
provide job accommodation to all of their disabled workers were an ineffective way to
increase labor market opportunities for people with disabilities. In particular, the results
suggest that these mandates made it more costly for firms to employ people with disabilities,
and, consequently, their employment fell."); CHRISTINE JOLLS & J.J. PRESCOTT,
DISAGGREGATING
D ISCRIMINATION 4

EMPLOYMENT

PROTECTION:

THE

CASE

OF

D ISABILITY

(Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10740, 2004) ("We
estimate that in the years just after its enactment the ADA produced approximately a 10
percent decline in disabled employment in states in which the law's reasonable
accommodations requirement was an innovation, compared to states in which a similar
requirement existed at the state level prior to the ADA's enactment. By contrast, we
consistently find little to no effect of the ADA 's enactment on disabled employment in states
in which the law's traditional antidiscrirnination prohibition, with its associated firing costs,
was an innovation, compared to states with similar preexisting prohibitions. Our results
therefore suggest that the reasonable accommodations requirement of the ADA, rather than
its imposition of firing costs, played the central role in the ADA's near-term employment
effects."). For criticism of the contention that Title l's reasonable accommodation provision
has had negative employment effects, see Peter Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of the
ADA 's Employment Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 289 (2003) ("[E]xisting
research provides little basis on which policymakers can make informed decisions regarding
how the ADA has impacted ADA-qualified individuals."); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur,
Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL 31, 31 (2003)
(" Studies finding a negative effect of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on the
employment of people with disabilities have used the work disability measure, which has
several potential problems in measuring employment trends. Using Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) data that permit alternative measures of disability, this study
finds decreased employment among those reporting work disabilities in the first few years
after the ADA was passed but increased employment when using a more probably
appropriate measure of ADA coverage (functional and activity limitations that do not
prevent work)."); Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics ofthe Americans
with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. E MP. &
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Reducing the cost of providing accommodation could increase
employers' willingness to hire disabled people. And augmenting
employers' willingness to hire disabled people is probably a surer
route to employment for more disabled people than relying on
litigation against recalcitrant employers, especially given the mounting
evidence that only a very small percentage of Title I suits result in
favorable judgments for the plaintiffs.64
Title I's statutory text may be indeterminate on the issue of
mitigation, but there are good reasons to impose such a duty. Part II
considers the form that the duty to mitigate under Title I should take.
II.

THE DUTY OF REASONA B L E MITIGATION

Establishing that there should be a duty to mitigate under Title I
does not settle the equally important questions about when that duty
should apply, what standard courts should use to enforce the duty, and
what evidence should be relevant. Let us turn now to the practical,
doctrinal issue of how Title I's duty to mitigate should be structured.
The small number of lower court opinions to consider the duty to
mitigate under Title I are divided on the question of whether the duty
should exist and have advanced no systematic way of thinking about
when the duty should apply. The opinions that reject the duty to
mitigate rely on the (unconvincing) argument about the present tense
in the ADA's definition of disability.65 The lower court opinions that
endorse a duty to mitigate, in turn, have not established any clear
rubric for implementing it. To the extent that these decisions imply
any standard for when the duty to mitigate should apply, most appear
to suggest that Title I plaintiffs are under a duty to mitigate whenever

LAB. L. 271, 303 (2000) ("[A]ttribution of disemployment results to the ADA is
premature.").

64. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
H ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) ("[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three
percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial
court level. Of those cases that are appealed, defendants prevail in eighty-four percent of
reported cases. These results are worse than results found in comparable areas of the law;
only prisoner rights cases fare as poorly.") (footnotes omitted); Study Finds Employers Win
Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998) ("The American Bar Association's (ABA's)
Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law . ... decided to analyze all the ADA
employment cases covered in the Reporter to determine the exact percentages of employer
and employee victories in such cases. The primary result . . . revealed that employers
prevailed in approximately 92 percent of the final case decisions-meaning cases that have
gone through the appeals process or have not been overturned on appeal as of March 31,
1998--thus contradicting the public perception that employers were more heavily burdened
by ADA Title I. This 92 percent figure is consistent with the results of an analysis of the
EEOC's statistics for administrative complaints, which reveals that employers prevail in 86
percent of the administrative complaints resolved by the EEOC.").

65. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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mitigation is possible. One recent United States District Court
opinion, for instance, states that "[w]here a person's impairment can
be treated and symptoms alleviated by mitigating factors such as
medication or treatments, such medications or treatments must be
taken into account in determining disability."66 "The Court cannot
permit [the plaintiff] to create a physical disability by failing to pursue
treatment options. "67 A second district court opinion holds that a
plaintiff is not protected under Title I because her "asthma is
correctable by medication," and she has not corrected it.68 A third
declares that " [a] plaintiff who does not avail himself of corrective
medication is not a qualified individual under the ADA."69 A few
other decisions seem to understand the duty to mitigate in more
limited terms, but none articulates a standard for when that duty
should apply. For example, one district court opinion notes in denying
a plaintiff Title I protection that the plaintiff has failed to take "a
reasonable measure" to mitigate. The opinion, however, does not
explore or explain the suggestion that the duty to mitigate might

66.

Hooper v. Saint Rose Parish, 205 F. Supp.2d 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 2002).

67. Id.
68. Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000), affd, 230
F.3d 1354 (4th Cir.2000) (mem.).
69. Hewitt v. Akan Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); see
also Hill v. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Hill further
argues that the drowsiness caused by taking hypertension medication in combination with
the pain relievers prescribed for her work-related injuries was an ADA disability. .. . [W]e
find no evidence in the record that Hill 's physical condition compelled her to take a
combination of medications that persistently affected her ability in 1995 to stay awake on the
job. Therefore, she failed to present sufficient evidence that this alleged physical impairment
substantially limited her major life activity of working."); Johnson v. Maynard, No. 01 Civ.
7393 (AKH), slip op. at 7-8 ( S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2003) ("Since plaintiff had medication
available to her, and knew that she could function normally if she took it, she cannot be said
to have been substantially impaired if she neglected to avail herself of such corrective
measures. ... Plaintiff's failure to take advantage of mitigating measures does not make her
a qualified individual under the ADA."); Mont-Ros v. City of West Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d
1338, 1356-57 ( S.D. Fla. 2000) ("[B]ecause Plaintiff's sleep apnea condition is treatable and
can be corrected with the use of a CPAP machine at night, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that
he is 'substantially limited in a major life activity."'); Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F.
Supp. 2d 1225, 1232-33 (D. Kan. 1999) ("[P]laintiff has conceded that on both occasions
when he had seizures at work, he was not taking Dilantin, which was prescribed to reduce
the chance of a seizure. The Supreme Court has recently held that if a disorder can be
controlled by medication or other corrective measures, it does not substantially limit a major
life activity. Although the facts indicate that taking Dilantin will not necessarily eliminate
seizures, it would make it far less likely that he would have seizures. Plaintiff does not
address this issue.") (citation omitted); Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937 F. Supp.
541, 548 (E.D. Va. 1996) ("Dr. Wittenburg found in April 1993 that, with treatment,
Roberts' depression should not affect his work performance. And it is undisputed that
several of Roberts' supervisors urged him to seek treatment, which he refused to do for a
period of more than fourteen months. .. . Roberts' refusal to seek the recommended and
available treatment precludes him from being a 'qualified individual with a disability' under
the ADA. ").

November 2004]

Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act

239

require plaintiffs to pursue only reasonable forms of mitigation.70
Similarly, another district court opinion suggests that the relevant
question might be whether the plaintiff's "alleged disability was easily
correctable," without elaborating on the suggestion or indicating what
the "easily" standard might mean.71
Part II's core proposal is that plaintiffs seeking Title I protection
should bear a duty of reasonable mitigation, a duty to undertake those
mitigating measures that could reduce their need for workplace
accommodation and that would be undertaken by a reasonable person
in the same situation-meaning, at the least, a reasonable person with
the same impairment, the same mitigating measures available, and the
same financial resources for mitigation. The justification for excluding
measures that could not lessen the plaintiff's accommodation
requirements from the duty to mitigate should be clear from the
previous discussion. A crucial reason to impose a duty to mitigate is to
ease the burden that providing accommodations can place on
employers. Mitigation cannot serve that function if it cannot diminish
a plaintiff's need for accommodation-either because the plaintiff
already requires no accommodation or because the mitigation cannot
have a large enough impact on the plaintiff's disability.
Section A explains why the duty to mitigate should be a duty of
reasonable mitigation, outlining the strengths of this core proposal and
describing how it would work with reference to the three major
categories of reasons why disabled people do not mitigate. This
Section argues that disabled people can have legitimate grounds for
not mitigating in some circumstances, so that it would be
inappropriate to require Title I plaintiffs to mitigate whenever
mitigation could reduce their need for accommodation. It also
contends that the reasonable mitigation standard has important
advantages over a number of other possible standards for when the
duty to mitigate should apply, like a standard requiring mitigation
whenever mitigation is not too risky for the plaintiff, or a standard
requiring mitigation that is not overly difficult for the plaintiff, or a
standard requiring mitigation that is financially affordable for the
plaintiff, or a standard requiring mitigation that costs less than what
the defendant would bear in accommodating the plaintiff. A
reasonable mitigation standard is more universal than a standard that
only considers risk or difficulty or expense, and courts can employ the
reasonable mitigation standard to evaluate the many different reasons
why a plaintiff might not mitigate. A duty of reasonable mitigation
also advances the ADA's explicit commitment to combating disabled

70. Rose v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614, 617 (D. Md. 2002).
71. Llante v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 3091, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
12, 1999).
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people's isolation and segregation. Courts should have relatively little
difficulty administering the duty of reasonable mitigation because
judges and juries already have substantial experience in applying
similar reasonable mitigation requirements to many legal settings,
including cases about torts, workers' compensation, Social Security
disability benefits, and private disability insurance policies.
Imposing a duty of reasonable mitigation should resolve the vast
bulk of Title I cases that raise the duty to mitigate issue. I contend,
moreover, that the reasonableness standard provides an appropriate
way of handling two particularly hard categories of cases. The first
involves plaintiffs who do not want to assume risks or side effects that
a reasonable person would assume, but that are serious nonetheless.
The second involves the small number of disabled people, mostly deaf,
who do not want to mitigate their disabilities even if a reasonable
person would because they believe that these disabilities are central to
their cultural identity. These two cases are discussed separately in
Section B.
A.

Core Cases

The reasonable mitigation standard provides an appropriate and
administrable way of dealing with the three major reasons why
disabled people do not mitigate: the risks or side effects associated
with mitigation, the difficulties of maintaining high levels of overall
health, and the financial costs associated with mitigation. This Section
will first discuss why it would be inappropriate to demand that all
disabled people who are not mitigating for one of these three reasons
mitigate as a condition of Title I protection. It will then explore the
benefits of applying a standard of reasonable mitigation to these
situations, as opposed to a number of other possible standards, and
explain how the reasonableness standard would work.
Consider why Title I should not deny protection to all of the
plaintiffs who are not mitigating because of risks or side effects
associated with mitigation. The risks and side effects that can come·
with mitigation range widely in seriousness and appear in two main
varieties, each of which dissuades some disabled people from
mitigating. First, there is the risk that the mitigation will not work, and
that attempting the mitigation will cost the person time, suffering,
money, or worsened health and functioning. In cochlear implant
surgery, for instance, a surgeon implants a device in the inner ear of a
deaf person that is meant to enable the person to understand oral
communication.72 But there are dangers associated with the

72. See, e.g. , Michael F. Dorman, An Overview of Cochlear Implants, in
A H ANDBOOK 5, 5-6 (Bonnie Poitras Tucker ed., 1998).

IMPLANTS:

COCHLEAR
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implantation procedure itself,73 and some people who receive cochlear
implants, including almost all adults who were deaf at birth, still
cannot process sound sufficiently well to comprehend speech.74 The
surgery, moreover, often damages and sometimes destroys any
residual hearing that the person has.75
73. See, e.g. , Noel L. Cohen & Ronald A. Hoffman, Complications of Cochlear Implant
Surgery in Adults and Children, 100 ANNALS 0TOLOGY, RHINOLOGY & LARYNGOLOGY
708, 708 (1991) (" Surgery for cochlear prosthesis insertion exposes the patient to several
potential risks. . . . Major complications usually have to do with surgical technique and
include flap necrosis, improper electrode placement, and rare facial nerve problems. Minor
complications include dehiscence of incisions, infection, facial nerve stimulation, dizziness,
and pedestal problems with the Ineraid device. "); id. at 711 ("Although life-threatening
complications are extremely rare, the devastating effects of major flap breakdown, facial
palsy, or incorrect electrode placement cannot be underestimated. Major flap breakdown
leads to device contamination and the need for intravenous antibiotics and/or surgical
revision. Multiple operations are sometimes required. The trauma of facial paralysis is well
known to all otolaryngologists. Faulty electrode placement results in lack of auditory
response, a particularly devastating outcome for a patient anticipating hearing restoration.
Patients suffer physically, financially, and psychologically."); Robert C. Wang et al.,
Cochlear Implant Flap Complications, 99 ANNALS 0TOLOGY, RHINOLOGY &
LARYNGOLOGY 791, 791 (1990) ("In a series of 52 patients who received cochlear implants,
4 patients suffered flap complications (7.7%). "); Philip J. Hilts, Drug Agency Is Studying Ear
Implants' Links to Meningitis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at A7, A7 (reporting that "(t)he
Food and Drug Administration is investigating what appears to be an increase in meningitis
among deaf patients who have had tiny devices called cochlear implants surgically inserted
deep inside their ears to help them hear ").
74. See, e.g., Dorman, supra note 72, at 19-20 ("Tests conducted in several countries
indicate, overwhelmingly, that patients who were deafened at birth and who were implanted
as adults obtain little speech understanding by means of an implant. Of all the patients
reported in the literature, only a few individuals achieve speech understanding scores at a
level above chance. ").
75. See, e.g., William J. Boggess et al., Loss of Residual Hearing After Cochlear
Implantation, 99 LARYNGOSCOPE 1002, 1004 (1989) ("The findings indicate a significant
downward shift in the hearing thresholds of the implanted ear following the insertion of a
25-mm electrode array. Although some patients demonstrated smaller shifts than others, the
shift is still great enough to be considered clinically significant (greater than 5 dB) for all
patients at one or more frequencies for the implanted ear. These findings are consistent with
the previous clinical reports . . . . Dye reported that 20% of single-channel cochlear implant
recipients had a loss of residual hearing attributable to the implant. All of those patients
received an older, long electrode. Rizer, et al. found that each of their six patients who
received a long multichannel electrode and the one reported patient who received a short
single-channel electrode, showed a loss of residual hearing. "); Bernard Fraysse et al.,
Cochlear Implan ts for Adults Obtaining Marginal Benefit from Acoustic Amplification: A
European Study, 19 AM. J. OTOLOGY 591, 594-95 (1998) ("The comparison of thresholds
showed that for all subjects, independent of the surgical technique used, a clinically
significant downward shift in unaided hearing thresholds was observed for the implant ear
after surgery with changes of ;?10-dB HL observed for at least one of the speech
frequencies. "); Th. Klenzner et al., Does Depth of Electrode Insertion Influence Inner Ear
Function in Cochlear Implant Patients?, in 1 4TH EUROPEAN CONGRESS OF 0TO-RHINO
LARYNGOLOGY HEAD AND NECK SURGERY 43, 43 (Klaus Jahnke & Markus Fischer eds.,
2000) ("Damage of inner ear function could be caused by the insertion of cochlear implant
(CI) electrodes. In the literature the possibility of preserving residual hearing is estimated at
about 50%.") (citation omitted); Henryk Skar:Zyllski et al., Preservation of Residual Hearing
in Children and Post-Lingually Deafened Adults After Cochlear Implantation: An Initial
Study, 64 ORL 247, 251 (2002) (reporting that "5 of 26 patients (19%) lost some residual
hearing " and "5 of 26 (19%) patients lost all measurable residual hearing after cochlear
implantation ").
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Second, there is the risk that even if the mitigation does work, in
the sense of accomplishing what it was supposed to, it may have
undesirable or dangerous side effects. Some common adverse features
of mitigation are the pain and convalescence period that can follow
surgery,76 and the time and effort consumed by complying with a
treatment regime that may require repeated medical visits or multiple
doses of medication each day.77 In addition, many mitigating measures
have severe side effects. Lithium, for example, is the leading
medication for the treatment of bipolar disorder.78 But people with
bipolar disorder often stop taking lithium because of its side effects,79

76. See, e.g., D. Janet Pavlin et al., Pain as a Factor Complicating Recovery and
Discharge After Ambulatory Surgery, 95 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 627, 627, 630 (2002)
("Pain is the most common medical cause of delayed recovery and discharge after
ambulatory surgery . . . . The present study demonstrates the relevance of pain as a factor
complicating the recovery and discharge of patients after ambulatory surgery. Nineteen
percent of patients reported severe pain after surgery (pain score ?.7 on a 10-point scale).").
77. See, e.g., S.P. Conway et al., Compliance with Treatment in Adult Patients with Cystic
Fibrosis, 51 THORAX 29, 30-31 (1996) ("The degree of effort and time needed for adherence
to prescriptions for nebulised antibiotics, dietary supplements and inhaled bronchodilators
accounted for 60%, 41 %, and 41 % of missed doses, respectively. Respondents gave more
than twice as many reasons for not doing physiotherapy as for any other treatment studied.
The major reasons for omitting physiotherapy were the time and commitment it demands
(44%) . . . . "); Seth A. Eisen et al., The Effect of Prescribed Daily Dose Frequency on Patient
Medication Compliance, 150 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1881, 1881 (1990) ("The objective
of this study was to determine the relationship between prescribed daily dose frequency and
patient medication compliance. The medication compliance of 105 patients receiving
antihypertensive medications was monitored by analyzing data obtained from special pill
containers that electronically record the date and time of medication removal. .. .
Compliance was defined as the percent of days during which the prescribed number of doses
were removed. Compliance improved from 59.0% on a three-time daily regimen to 83.6 %
on a once-daily regimen. Thus, compliance improves dramatically as prescribed dose
frequency decreases. Probably the single most important action that health care
professionals can take to improve compliance is to select medications that permit the lowest
daily prescribed dose frequency. ").
78. See, e.g. , Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patien ts with
Bipolar Disorder, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 5 ( Supp. Dec. 1994); Trevor Silverstone &
Sarah Romans, Long Term Treatment of Bipolar Disorder, 51 DRUGS 367, 367-68, 370
(1996).
79. See, e.g. , Js;;rgen Aagaard & Per Vestergaard, Predictors of Outcome in Prophylactic
Lithium Treatment: A 2-Year Prospective Study, 18 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 259, 260-61,
264 (1990) ("133 patients participated in the study . .. . The non-adherent group was defined
as those 56 (42.1 % ) patients who stopped treatment at least once within the first 2 years.
None of these patients were medically advised to stop. . . . The most frequent reason given
by the patient to stop treatment was side effects .... ); Kay R. Jamison et al., Patient and
Physician Attitudes Toward Lithium: Relationship to Compliance, 36 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 866, 869 (1979) ("Approximately one half of our patients reported
discontinuing lithium treatment against medical advice at least once. "); id. at 868 ("From the
patient's perspective, the most important reasons for noncompliance were (1) they were
bothered by the idea that their moods were controlled by a medication; (2) they were
bothered by the idea of having a chronic illness, symbolized by the necessity of lithium
therapy, and (3) side effects (particularly lethargy, decreased coordination, and dulling of
senses). Those patients who reported actually discontinuing lithium were significantly more
likely to also report 'missing highs' and the hassle of taking medications as important reasons
for noncompliance. "); Mario Maj et al., Long-Term Outcome of Lithium Prophyla xis in
"
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which can include impaired memory and cognitive functioning,80
tremors,81 hypothyroidism,82 weight gain,83 birth defects,84 and a loss of
Bipolar Disorder: A 5-Year Prospective Study of 402 Patients at a Lithium Clinic, 155 AM. J.
30, 30, 32 (1998) ("Of the 402 enrolled patients, 27.9% were no longer taking
lithium at follow-up . . . . Of the 1 12 interviewed patients who were not taking lithium at
follow-up, 95 (84.8%) had interrupted prophylaxis on their own initiative. The alleged main
reason for interruption of medication was its perceived inefficacy in 35 cases, trouble related
to side effects in 27, the conviction that the patient was cured and needed no more drugs in
17, the annoyance of taking medicines in 11, and loss of energy or productivity in five."); A.J.
Mander, ls Lithium Justified After One Manic Episode?, 73 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA 60, 66 (1986) ("The life table analysis clearly indicates that lithium, if taken
continuously and, presumably, for life, will significantly reduce the risk of relapse. However,
many patients take their lithium for a limited time only, [so that] the outcome of the group
that the clinicians intended to treat [with lithium] is not different from the control group.");
id. ("Most patients are only in their 3rd or 4th decade after their first admission for mania.
They are unlikely to view the prospect of long-term prophylaxis with much enthusiasm,
especially with the possibility of serious side effects, which include tremor, renal problems
and the risk of accidental intoxication. It is not surprising therefore that they quickly
discontinue it. ").
PSYCHIATRY

80. See, e.g. ,

ROBERT

M.

JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG

ACTION:

A CONCISE,

NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO THE ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOACTIVE
DRUGS 316 (rev. ed. 2001) ("Chronic lithium therapy is accompanied by adverse effects on

memory and cognitive functioning. Some researchers report improvements in motor
performance, cognition, and creative ability after lithium withdrawal, implying detrimental
effects of lithium in these areas during drug therapy."); Michael J. Gitlin et al., Maintenance
Lithium Treatment: Side Effects and Compliance, 50 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 127, 130
(1989) ("[P]atients indicated that they perceived cognitive changes and weight gain as more
troublesome and more likely to provoke lithium noncompliance. This observation was
demonstrated by two findings: (1) the five side effects most likely to cause noncompliance
were cognitive and weight symptoms; and (2) patients who self-reported lithium
discontinuation perceived themselves as having greater cognitive side effects in general
and mental slowness specifically-compared with patients who reported never having
stopped lithium treatment. ").
81. See, e.g., DIAGNOSTIC
(4th ed., text rev. 2000).

AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

805-06

82 See, e.g. , THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PRESS TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 967
(Robert E. Hales et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) ("Hypothyroidism may occur in as many as 20% of
patients treated with lithium. ") (citations omitted); Rose Salata & Irwin Klein, Effects of
Lithium on the Endocrine System: A Review, 1 1 0 J. LABORATORY & CLINICAL MED. 130,
131 (1987) ("On the average, 5% to 15% of patients given long-term lithium treatment are
reported to show clinical signs or chemical evidence of hypothyroidism.").
83. See, e.g. , Y. Chen

& T. Silverstone, Lithium and Weight Gain, 5 INT'L CLINICAL
217, 217 (1990) ("We found 14 studies concerning the clinical use
of lithium in which data on weight were given. Weight gain was reported to have occurred in
1 1 % to 65% of the patients studied. Among 100 patients taking lithium continuously for 1-2
years, 11 gained more than 5 kg and subsequent weight reduction was said to be difficult. ")
(citations omitted); P. Vestergaard et al., Prospective Studies on a Lithium Cohort: 3.
Tremor, Weight Gain, Diarrhea, Psychological Complaints, 78 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA 434, 436 (1988) ("The body weight rose in 73% of the patients [taking
lithium], fell in 18% and remained constant in 9%. A weight gain of 10 kg or more was seen
in 21 % of the patients, of 20 kg or more in 2 %.").
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY

84. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 316 ("Lithium possesses a degree of teratogenic
potential, especially to the heart of the developing fetus."); Silverstone & Romans, supra
note 78, at 373 ("[L]ithium is not advised during pregnancy, particularly in the first trimester,
as the risk of fetal malformation involving the cardiovascular system (Ebstein's anomaly) is
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the heightened creativity, mental concentration, and productivity that
can be associated with mania.85 Similarly, electroconvulsive therapy is
one of the most effective treatments for major depression, yet it
commonly results in memory loss.86 There are also a variety of drugs
available to treat depression, but they can have side effects that
include cognitive and memory impairment,87 seizures,88 blurred
vision,89 sedation,90 sleep disturbances,91 sexual dysfunction,92 weight
gain,93 and the risk of death if a person takes the antidepressants with
certain foods and medicines.94 Similarly, antiepileptic medications can
cause interference with learning ability,95 aggressive behavior,96
greater in the children of women prescribed this drug during pregnancy than that of women
not so exposed.").
85. For an eloquent account of this loss, see KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET
MIND 5-6 (1995) ("My manias, at least in their early and mild forms, were absolutely
intoxicating states that gave rise to great personal pleasure, an incomparable flow of
thoughts, and a ceaseless energy that allowed the translation of new ideas into papers and
projects. "); id. at 91-92 ("Even though I was a clinician and a scientist, and even though I
could read the research literature and see the inevitable, bleak consequences of not taking
lithium, I for many years after my initial diagnosis was reluctant to take my medications as
prescribed. . . . It was difficult to give up the high flights of mind and mood, even though the
depressions that inevitably followed nearly cost me my life. . . . When I am my present
'normal' self, I am far removed from when I have been my liveliest, most productive, most
intense, most outgoing and effervescent.").
86. See, e.g. , Keith G. Rasmussen et al., Electroconvulsive Therapy and Newer
Modalities for the Treatment of Medication-Refractory Mental Illness, 77 MAYO CLINIC
PROC. 552, 553-54 (2002); id. at 554 ("Electroconvulsive therapy-induced memory
impairment takes 3 forms. The first is posttreatment confusion.... The second type of
memory impairment with ECT is anterograde amnesia.... the inability to recall information
learned after the treatments have begun. . .. The third and most bothersome type of ECT
induced memory impairment is retrograde amnesia, forgetting things that happened before
the course of treatments. .. . Usually, only a few events, such as conversations, are forgotten,
but patients occasionally forget most of the events of this period. Additionally, patients
sometimes have sporadic episodes of forgetting personal life events that happened several
years before treatment. Some of the forgotten events may never be remembered. ").
87. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290-91, 296; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 74950, 1106, 1111, 1344, 1347, 1682-83, 2676, 2679 (57th ed. 2003).
88. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note
87, at 1682-83.
89. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290;
87, at 749-50, 1106, 1108-09.

PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE,

90. See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 290, 293, 301;
supra note 87, at 1106, 1111, 1603, 1607, 2562-63, 2627.
91. See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293, 297;
note 87, at 1603, 1607, 1682, 1685-86, 2562-63.

supra note

PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE,

PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE,

supra

92. See, e.g., JULIEN, supra note 80, at 293-94, 297-98; PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE,
supra note 87, at 749-50, 1232, 1236, 1344, 1346, 1603, 1607, 2562-63, 2676, 2678-79.

93. See, e.g. , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 749-50, 1232, 1236, 256263.
94. See, e.g. ,
note 87, at 2562.

JULIEN,

supra note 80, at 302-03;

95. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 96-97.

PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE,

supra
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hyperactivity,97 blood disorders,98 liver damage,99 abnormal vision, 100
weight gain,101 and birth defects.102 Haldol can help control the
symptoms of Tourette's syndrome, but it can also have a number of
side effects, including tardive dyskinesia, a potentially permanent
condition that causes the muscles in a person's face and body to spasm
and twitch involuntarily.103 Moreover, Haldol can slow thought, curtail
creative inspiration and expression, and-in the words of one person
with Tourette's who decided to take the drug only during the work
week-make a person '"sober, solid, [and] square.'"104
If Title I plaintiffs were required to assume any risk and bear any
side effect associated with mitigation that could reduce their need for
accommodation, that would mean that they would have to endanger
96. See, e.g. , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 2906-07.
97. See, e.g. , JULIEN, supra note 80, at 96.
98. See, e.g., id. at 96-97;
3249-50.

PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE,

supra note 87, at 421-22, 425,

99. See, e.g. , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 421-23, 433, 3249-50.
100. See, e.g. , id. at 2565-67.
101. See, e.g. , Jouko LT. Isojarvi et al., Obesity and Endocrine Disorders in Women
Taking Valproate for Epilepsy, 39 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 579, 582 (1996) ("More than half of
our patients taking valproate were obese, and the average increase in body weight in the 11
women (50% of the subjects on valproate) experiencing an indisputable weight gain was 21
kg. These findings are in accordance with previous reports of weight gain in 44 to 5 7 % of
patients treated with valproate. Therefore, obesity seems to be a common and in some cases,
a very severe adverse effect of valproate treatment.") (citations omitted).
102. See, e.g. ,
87, at 421-23, 433.

JULIEN,

supra note 80, at 98;

PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE,

supra note

103. See, e.g. , PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 2464-65.
104.

M AN WHO MISTOOK H IS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER
95 (1985) (quoting Ray, a patient); see also id. at 96 ('"You 'normals', who
have the right transmitters in the right places at the right times in your brains, have all
feelings, all styles, available all the time - gravity, levity, whatever is appropriate. We
Touretters don't: we are forced into levity by our Tourette's and forced into gravity when we
take haldol. You are free, you have a natural balance: we must make the best of an artificial
balance."' (quoting Ray)).
There is also the risk of something that might be considered a less obvious side effect of
mitigation: that the use of the mitigating device or process will itself be stigmatic. Some
disabled people avoid using mitigating measures that make their disability more apparent in
an effort to avoid this stigma. For instance, some people will walk with great difficulty and
pain to avoid using a wheelchair, or will greatly limit their daily movements to avoid using a
walker. See, e.g. , DENNIS BYRD & MICHAEL D 'ORSO, RISE AND WALK: THE TRIAL AND
TRIUMPH OF DENNIS BYRD 240 (1993); STEVE FIFFER, THREE QUARTERS, Two DIMES,
AND A NICKEL: A MEMOIR OF BECOMING WHOLE 263 (1999); ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE
BODY SILENT 61, 92-93 (1987); S. Kay Toombs, Sufficient unto the Day: A Life with Multiple
Sclerosis, in CHRONIC ILLNESS: FROM EXPERIENCE TO POLICY 3, 18 ( S. Kay Toombs et al.
eds., 1995). Some people will not use a white cane because they do not want to reveal their
blindness. See, e.g. , STEPHEN KUUSISTO, PLANET OF THE BLIND 65, 100 (1998); Jacobus
tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV.
841, 903 (1966). Some people will leave their mental illnesses untreated so that they do not
have to identify themselves as mentally ill. See, e.g. , JAMISON, supra note 85, at 54; see also
Roberts v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 937 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Va. 1996).
OLIVER SACKS, THE

CLINICAL TALES

246

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:217

themselves, no matter the probability of benefit. As we have seen, the
dangers associated with mitigation can be substantial, and mitigating
measures with high failure rates or serious side effects may have a
relatively small chance of causing a notable improvement in the
plaintiff's overall condition. Requiring plaintiffs to assume any risk
and bear any side effect would also be massively inefficient, as it
would encourage plaintiffs to expend significant efforts on activities
unlikely to make them more prepared for employment. A person who
undertakes a mitigating measure that has a large risk of failure or that
brings substantial side effects may often do little to enhance his ability
to work and may instead simply replace a biological impairment with a
medically induced one.
It would be similarly inappropriate to exclude plaintiffs from Title
I protection because they do not maintain extremely high levels of
overall health as a means of mitigation. While even able-bodied
Americans frequently have trouble sustaining high standards of
general health,105 some physical and mental impairments make general
health maintenance especially difficult. Exercise may be arduous or
impossible given some impairments.106 Weight gain is a common side
effect of many of the drugs designed to mitigate various disabilities.107
Studies suggest that smoking, which is much more common among the
mentally ill than in the general population, 108 can alleviate the

105. See, e.g. , Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., State-Specific Prevalence of Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults - United
States, 2002, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 127 7 , 1277 (2004) ("Cigarette
smoking in the United States causes serious illnesses among an estimated 8.6 million persons
and approximately 440,000 deaths annually . .. . ") (footnote omitted); id. at 1278 ("During
2002, the median prevalence of current smoking in the 50 states and DC was 23.1 % (range:
12.7 % [Utah]-32.6 % [Kentucky]).") (citation omitted); Katherine M. Flegal et al.,
Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999-2000, 288 JAMA 1723, 1723
(2002) ("[A] [s]urvey of 4115 adult men and women conducted in 1999 and 2000 as part of
the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANE S), a nationally
representative sample of the US population.... [found that] [t]he age-adjusted prevalence
of obesity was 30.5% in 1999-2000 compared with 22.9% in [a nationally representative
survey conducted between 1988 and 1994] .... The prevalence of overweight also increased
during this period from 55.9% to 64.5% .... ).
"

106. See, e.g. , ABLE LIVES: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF PARALYSIS 63 (Jenny Morris ed.,
1989) ("Many were concerned about putting on weight, echoing the problems faced by a lot
of non-disabled women as they grow older. Most people tend to put on weight as they age,
but we have the added difficulty of not being able to exercise so easily, and of extra weight
being more noticeable when you are sitting down.").
107. See supra text accompanying notes 83, 93, 101.
108. See, e.g. , Alexander H. Glassman et al., Smoking, Smoking Cessation, and Major
Depression, 264 JAMA 1546, 1546 (1990) ("We conducted a test of th[e] association
['between cigarette smoking and major depressive disorder'], employing population-based
data (n=3213) collected between 1980 and 1983 in the St Louis Epidemiologic Catchment
Area Survey of the National Institute of Mental Health. A history of regular smoking was
observed more frequently among individuals who had experienced major depressive
disorder at some time in their lives than among individuals who had never experienced
major depression or among individuals with no psychiatric diagnosis. Smokers with major
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symptoms of various mental illnesses and that some people with
mental illnesses may use smoking to self-medicate.109 A disability can

depression were also less successful at their attempts to quit than were either of the
comparison groups."); id. at 1548 ("A multiple logistic regression showed that the
relationship between major depression and smoking was independent of age, sex, education,
marital status, and race . . . . ); John R. Hughes et al., Prevalence of Smoking A mongst
Psychiatric Outpatients, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 993, 993 (1986) ("The prevalence of
smoking among psychiatric outpatients (N=277) was significantly higher than among either
local or national population-based samples (N=l,440 and 17,000) (52% versus 30% and
33%). The higher prevalence was not associated with the age, sex, marital status,
socioeconomic status, alcohol use, coffee use, or institutionalization of the psychiatric
patients. Smoking was especially prevalent among patients with schizophrenia (88%) or
mania (70%) and among the more severely ill patients."); id. at 995 tbl.2 (reporting the
smoking rates for patients with major depressive disorder (49%), anxiety disorder (47%),
personality disorder (46%), and adjustment disorder (45%)); Karen Lasser et al., Smoking
and Mental Illness: A Population-Based Prevalence Study, 284 JAMA 2606, 2606 (2000) ("[In
a nationally representative population sample,] [c]urrent smoking rates for respondents with
no mental illness, lifetime mental illness, and past-month mental illness were 22.5%, 34.8 %,
and 41.0%, respectively. Lifetime smoking rates were 39.1 %, 55.3%, and 59.0%,
respectively .. . . Smokers with any history of mental illness had a self-reported quit rate of
37.1 % . . . , and smokers with past-month mental illness had a self-reported quit rate of
30.5% . . . compared with smokers without mental illness (42.5%) .... Persons with a mental
disorder in the past month consumed approximately 44.3% of cigarettes smoked by this
nationally representative sample."); id. at 2607 ("We defined mental illness as major
depression, bipolar disorder, dysthymia, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, simple
phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse, alcohol dependence, drug abusr drug
dependence, antisocial personality, conduct disorder, or nonaffective psychosis. The �atter
includes schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, delusional
disorder, and atypical psychosis."); id. at 2608 ("The relationship between smoking and
mental illness persisted when we controlled for age, sex, and geographic region using logistic
regression ... .").
"

109. See, e.g. , Glassman, supra note 108, at 1548 ("In a recent examination of
withdrawal symptoms during the first week following smoking cessation, we observed that,
among smokers without a history of major depression, symptoms of depression were, in fact,
rather uncommon and, when they did occur, were generally mild. However, among smokers
with a history of major depression, depressed mood during withdrawal was very common
and was associated with failure in smoking cessation efforts."); id. at 1548-49 ("Clinical
experience suggests that those few depressed smokers who do succeed in stopping are at
increased risk to develop another episode of major depression. We have seen a number of
cases in which smokers with a history of major depression who are not depressed at the time
they try to quit get seriously depressed shortly after giving up cigarettes."); id. at 1549 ("[O]n
a number of occasions we have seen serious depressions that gradually developed following
smoking cessation disappear within hours of resuming cigarette smoking. In addition, a
number of these patients had experienced depressive episodes associated with prior smoking
cessation attempts. These observations, together with our earlier evidence that these
smokers frequently develop depressive symptoms when they try to stop, suggest that these
are causally connected events and that nicotine withdrawal can provoke episodes of major
depression.") (footnote omitted); Donald C. Goff et al., Cigarette Smoking in Schizophrenia:
Relationship to Psychopathology and Medication Side Effects, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 189,
1192-93 (1992) ("Nicotine also improves concentration and decreases distractibility in
normal subjects evaluated with the Stroop Test. Patients with schizophrenia have been
shown to be particularly impaired in their performance on this test, raising the possibility
that schizophrenic smokers may be self-medicating a cognitive deficit. . .. Self-medication of
more subtle cognitive or affective symptoms during adolescence, before the onset of overt
psychotic illness, may also contribute to the higher rate of smoking in schizophrenic
patients.") (citations omitted).
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also be a source of stress, which may make weight gain110 and
smoking111 more likely.
Along the same lines, a duty of mitigation that required disabled
people to bear any financial cost associated with mitigation, no matter
their financial resources, would ignore Congress's recognition "that
people with disabilities, as a group, . . . are severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally."112 Mitigation
can sometimes be expensive. For example, glaucoma medication
needed to preserve vision can cost over $2000 a year.113 A manual
wheelchair can cost between $500 and $4000, and a motorized
wheelchair can cost as much as $20,000.114 The cost of a single hearing

110. See, e.g. , Henry A. Jordan et al., Patterns of Weight Change: The Interval 6 to J O
Years After Initial Weight Loss in a Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment Program, 57 PSYCHOL.
REP. 195, 202 (1985) ("The fluctuation in weight over time may suggest, perhaps, that
patients may experience weight gains during periods of stress. When the stress is alleviated,
they lose the weight. Motivation for weight control for most of the present patients probably
waxes and wanes, perhaps in relation to the major events in their lives. Such fluctuations are
related not only to a commitment to control eating but also to the effort necessary to handle
both routine and nonroutine life events. ").
111. See, e.g. , Ovide F. Pomerleau & Cynthia S. Pomerleau, Neuroregulators and the
Reinforcement of Smoking: Towards a Biobehavioral Explanation, 8 NEUROSCIENCE &
B IOBEHAVIORAL RE V 503, 504 (1984) ("It has been observed that many schedules and
situations found to be effective in provoking nicotine self-administration might accurately be
described as stressful. A link between nicotine and stress is also suggested by the findings of
Schachter and colleagues, who demonstrated that smokers smoke more when anxious or
when subjected to painful stimulation (e.g., before giving a lecture, during doctoral
examinations, receiving electric shocks, etc.).") (citations omitted); see also Rose v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614 n.7 (D. Md. 2002) ("Rose [who has respiratory
problems] attempts to explain away his smoking habit as an unavoidable condition, possibly
even a disability.... He . . . blames his 'smoking addiction ' on stress. He states '[w]hen I am
undergoing periods of stress, I smoke more. In the past, I have smoked as few as 112 pack of
cigarettes a day (without Wellbutrin). When I am undergoing stressful periods, I have
smoked up to two packs of cigarettes a day."'); LIZZIE SIMON, DETOUR: MY B IPOLAR
ROAD TRIP IN 4-D, at 26 (2002) ("Lithium wasn't the only drug that helped me recover after
I was diagnosed with manic depression. Eventually I was smoking pot about five times a
day . . . . I needed to be high all the time because I couldn't deal with the intensity of what
had happened to me ... . For me, pot was a bridge back to real life, a cushiony warm soft
bridge that made the day-to-day OK while my brain and body adjusted to lithium and while
my soul began to digest the trauma. Also, pot made it easy to be social again after the most
alienating and horrifying experience of my life.").
.

112. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2000).
113. See, e.g., J. William Doyle et al., Glaucoma Medical Treatment-2002: Does Yearly
Cost Now Equal the Year?, 79 OPTOMETRY & VISION SCI. 489, 489 (2002).
114. See, e.g. , Lynn Bryant, Cost of Wheelchairs: Are You Paying Too Much?, ACCENT
LIVING, Fall 1994, at 28, 28; see also Ian Austen, A Leg with a Mind of Its Own, N.Y.
nMEs, Jan. 3, 2002, at Gl, G4 ("The C-Leg [prosthetic leg], which was introduced to the
United States market in 1999, costs $40,000 to $50,000, compared with $15,000 for a non
electronic hydraulic model.").
ON
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aid can range from approximately $400 to approximately $3000,115 and
a cochlear implant device can cost approximately $20,000.116
Not surprisingly, tort jurisprudence indicates that some disabled
people do not have access to the funds needed for mitigation, 117 and
that people disabled by tort are not obligated to mitigate if they
cannot afford the cost of doing so.118 Medicaid and private health
insurance policies do not always pay for mitigation. For example,
Medicaid programs in five states do not provide customized
wheelchairs to adults, and Medicaid programs in six states do not
provide motorized wheelchairs to adults.119 Medicaid programs in at
least eighteen states usually or often fail to cover the full cost of a
cochlear implant device.120 Some private insurance policies also do not
cover the full cost of a cochlear implant device,121 and most private
insurance policies do not pay for hearing aids.122
Forty-five million people in America, moreover, currently have no
public or private health insurance, often because they are
unemployed.123 It would be ironic if the duty of mitigation denied
some disabled people protection against employment discrimination
because they cannot afford to mitigate, when they cannot afford to
mitigate because no one will hire them. Even if a disabled person
managed to undertake mitigation by going into debt, protection under
Title I is no guarantee of obtaining employment.
Given that a disabled person's reasons for not mitigating can
sometimes be legitimate and sometimes not, it would be inappropriate

115. See, e.g. , Time to Deal with Hearing Loss?,
2002, at 1, 1.

CONSUMER REP. ON HEALTH,

May

116. See, e.g. , J. Robert Wyatt et al., Cost Utility of the Multichannel Cochlear Implant in
258 Profoundly Deaf Individuals, 106 LARYNGOSCOPE 816, 819 tbl.IV (1996).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
118. See, e.g., Fuches v. S.E. S. Co., 459 N.W.2d 642, 643 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) ("[A]
person may be excused from mitigating damages if they lack sufficient financial resources to
do so."); Seagers v. Pailet, 656 So. 2d 700, 714 ( La. Ct. App. 1995) ("Failure to undergo
corrective surgery because the plaintiff cannot monetarily afford to do so is not failure to
mitigate damages.").
119. See Esteban v. Cook, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1257 ( S.D. Fla. 1999).
120. See Steven Garber et al., Payment Under Public and Private Insurance and Access
to Cochlear Implants, 128 ARCHIVES OTOLARYNGOLOGY-HEAD & NECK SURGERY 1145,
1150 (2002).
121. See id.
122. See Time to Deal with Hearing Loss?, supra note 115, at 1.
123. See

CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 14

(2004) ("An estimated 15.6 percent of the population, or 45.0 million people, were without
health insurance coverage in 2003, up from 15.2 percent and 43.6 million people in 2002.");
id. at 17 ("Of those 18 to 64 years old in 2003, full-time workers were more likely to be
covered by health insurance (82.5 percent) than part-time workers (76.2 percent) or
nonworkers (74.0 percent).").

250

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:217

for the duty to mitigate to demand mitigation whenever it could
reduce the person's need for accommodation. A rule demanding all
possible mitigation to lessen accommodation requirements might, in
its relative absoluteness, have the advantage of relative clarity, but it
would not take account of the plaintiff's legitimate interests. Yet that
still does not answer the question of when mitigation should be
required. A plaintiff seeking the protection of Title I could, for
example, be obligated to mitigate when mitigation is not too risky for
the plaintiff, or could be obligated to mitigate when mitigation is not
overly difficult for the plaintiff, or could be obligated to mitigate when
mitigation is not too expensive for the plaintiff, or could be obligated
to mitigate when mitigation costs less than what the defendant would
bear in accommodating the plaintiff (a "least-cost-avoider" standard).
A duty of reasonable mitigation would have a number of
advantages over these other potential standards. First, the reasonable
mitigation standard is more universal than a standard that looks
exclusively at risk or difficulty or expense, and it provides courts with
a means of assessing the many different reasons why a disabled person
might decide not to mitigate. The duty of reasonable mitigation would
require a plaintiff seeking Title I protection to undertake those
mitigating measures that could reduce the plaintiff's need for
accommodation and that a reasonable person in the same situation
would undertake. There are a variety of ways to define the "same
situation," but some clear requirements suggested by the preceding
discussion of reasons for avoiding mitigation are that the reasonable
person have the same condition, the same mitigating measures
available, and the same financial resources for mitigation. This
reasonable. mitigation standard would mean that a Title I plaintiff
would be obligated to assume only those risks or side effects that a
reasonable person would assume to eliminate or improve the
condition in question, to take only those steps to improve his overall
health that a reasonable person with the same condition would take,
and to bear only those costs associated with mitigation that a
reasonable person with the same financial means would bear. In this
way, the reasonable mitigation standard would provide some
assurance that the law is not obligating Title I plaintiffs to subject
themselves to pointless harm, along with a means of recognizing the
obstacles to health maintenance that a plaintiff may be experiencing
and adjusting for what the plaintiff can afford.
Second, the reasonable mitigation standard advances the ADA's
goal of combating the "isolat[ion] and segregat[ion]" of disabled
people.124 A least-cost-avoider standard for applying the duty to
mitigate would promote the clustering of disabled employees in

124. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
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relatively few workplaces-those able to provide accommodations at
relatively low cost because of their efficiency, economies of scale,
centralized location, or industry. Plaintiffs suing employers with
relatively low costs of accommodation would be more likely to win
Title I protection on the ground that mitigation would be more
expensive than accommodation; plaintiffs suing employers with
relatively high costs of accommodation would be more likely to be
denied Title I protection on the ground that accommodation would be
more expensive than mitigation. This clustering of disabled
employees, however, would at least partially frustrate the ADA's
commitment to the integration of disabled people in the workplace.
The clustering would also help concentrate the costs that Title I
imposes on a relatively small group of employers, which would raise
distributional fairness concerns.125 A least-cost-avoider standard for
applying the duty to mitigate is not necessary to limit an employer's
financial liability, moreover. Title I already provides that an employer
does not have to make an accommodation where it "can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of [its] business."126 Perhaps more importantly, the duty of
reasonable mitigation leaves employers with significant flexibility in
many situations where the cost of mitigation is less than the cost of
accommodation. Where mitigation would be reasonable but for the
expense it would impose on the plaintiff, and the defendant-employer
agrees to bear all or part of that expense, the plaintiff would be
obligated to mitigate if a reasonable person in the plaintiff's situation,
faced with whatever expenses remain, would mitigate.
Third, the reasonable mitigation standard should not be unduly
difficult for courts to administer because judges and juries have
substantial experience in applying similar standards of reasonable
mitigation to many related legal contexts.127 Defendants in common
law tort actions, for example, frequently contend that the people they
have disabled by tort have failed to mitigate, and many courts have
held in these cases that a tort victim's damage award will be reduced if
he did not undertake mitigating measures that a reasonable person in

125. See supra Part I.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
127. Compared to a least-cost-avoider standard, a duty of reasonable mitigation would
also make it more possible for disabled people to assess whether they have complied with
the duty to mitigate and to plan accordingly. The reasonable mitigation standard depends on
information outside the employer's control, such as information about what other disabled
people in the same situation have done. See infra text accompanying notes 134-37. A least
cost-avoider standard, in contrast, depends on the defendant's cost of accommodation,
information that the employer controls and that only it may know. A disabled person may
have few ways of determining an employer's cost of accommodation until he requests an
accommodation, and even then he may not gain access to all the relevant data.
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the same situation would have undertaken.128 This jurisprudence, in
tum, evaluates when mitigation is reasonable,129 and when it is not.130
128. See, e.g. , Stark v. Shell Oil Co., 450 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1971) ("This case is
governed by Louisiana law. The law of Louisiana is that an injured person must submit to
reasonable treatment, including an operation if it is shown that the operation will alleviate
the disability.") (citation omitted); Salas v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 202, 211 (W.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Under New York law, an injured party has a duty to mitigate her damages, and in
that regard is required to make a reasonable effort and to act as a reasonable, prudent
person would under the circumstances."); Greenwood v. Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 205
(Iowa 2001) ("[T]here must be substantial evidence that there was something that the
plaintiff could do to mitigate his loss and that requiring the plaintiff to do so was reasonable
under the circumstances. Furthermore, it must be shown that the plaintiff acted
unreasonably in failing to undertake the mitigating activity.") (citation omitted); Jacobs v.
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 432 So. 2d 843, 845 ( La. 1983) ("[A]n accident victim has a
duty to exercise reasonable diligence and ordinary care to minimize his damages after the
injury has been inflicted."); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 531 (Me. 1978) ("There is a
positive duty upon a person injured through the negligence of another to minimize his
damages and to use reasonable diligence in securing medical or surgical aid."); Adee v.
Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177, 180 (Minn. 1979) ("Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages by
acting reasonably in obtaining treatment for her injury."); Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608
So. 2d 1149, 1162-63 (Miss. 1992) ("Without question, a person injured in tort is required to
take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages, and this, at the very least, includes giving
attention to doctor's orders regarding his course of recovery."); Frisnegger v. Gibson, 598
P.2d 574, 581 (Mont. 1979) ("[T]he trial court . . . allowed the jury to consider whether
Frisnegger should have submitted to treatment, including possible surgery, on the
reasonable person test. Where mitigation of damages is concerned, we have supported the
reasonable person test or the ordinarily prudent person test in property damage cases. We
hold that the District Court properly submitted the mitigation issues to the jury on that basis
here ... .") (citations omitted); Automatic Merchandisers, Inc. v. Ward, 646 P.2d 553, 554
(Nev. 1982) (per curiam) ("It is unquestioned that an injured person cannot recover for
damages which could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care. The doctrine of
mitigation of damages has been applied to preclude recovery for disability which could have
been avoided if the plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking medical care,
including surgical treatment.") (citation omitted); Favier v. Winick, 583 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) ("Generally, a party who claims to have suffered personal injuries by
reason of the defendant's negligence or other tortious conduct is required to use reasonable
and proper effort to make the damage as small as practicable, and is not entitled to recover
for any damage which by the use of such effort might have been avoided.") (citations
omitted); Dunn v. Maxey, 693 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) ("The law in Ohio
precludes one who is injured by the tort of another from recovering damages for harm that
could have been avoided by reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the
tort."); Zimmerman v. Ausland, 513 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Or. 1973) ("It is equally well
established that the plaintiff in a personal injury case cannot claim damages for what would
otherwise be a permanent injury if the permanency of the injury could have been avoided by
submitting to treatment by a physician, including possible surgery, when a reasonable person
would do so under the same circumstances."); Yost v. Union R.R. Co., 551 A.2d 317, 322
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) ("When determining damages for personal injuries in Pennsylvania, it
is proper for a jury to consider the failure of the plaintiff to undergo surgery or medical
treatment that an ordinarily prudent man would have submitted to under the circumstances
in an effort to better his condition."); Cox v. Keg Rests. U.S., Inc., 935 P.2d 1377, 1380
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("An injured party generally may not recover damages proximately
caused by that person's unreasonable failure to mitigate."); Lobermeier v. Gen. Tel. Co. of
Wis., 349 N.W.2d 466, 474 (Wis. 1984) ("The question is one of fact for the jury-what was a
reasonable course of conduct, under the circumstances, to mitigate the injuries or
damages.").
129. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1176, 1182 ( La. 1979) ("Dr. Vogel
opined that at least eighty or ninety percent of the patient's discomfort should be relieved by
treatment, which would probably include an operation. . . . We therefore agree that the trial
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Along the same lines, many courts reviewing the decisions of workers'
compensation boards have found that a plaintiff seeking compensation
for a workplace accident has a duty to take reasonable steps to
mitigate his injury.131 Similarly, many courts reviewing decisions on
court's award should be amended to eliminate any recovery for permanent loss of earning
capacity. "); Leaman v. Cont'! Cas. Co., 798 So. 2d 285, 293 (La. Ct. App. 2001) ("[W)e find
that Cooper's decision not to use a permanent orthodontic retainer or splint recommended
by her orthodontist, Dr. Marshall Gottsgen, was error. "); Flight Line, Inc., 608 So. 2d at
1162-63 (" Substantial evidence reflects Tanksley did not follow doctor's orders and likely
worsened his injuries as result. On November 4, 1984, he ignored instructions and reinjured
himself,and it is true this led to his first surgery. Following this first surgery,Tanksley did
indeed lie about a pinprick test because he was bored at home and thought he should return
to work and, as a result,Dr. Stringer released him to go back to work to 'light duty' sooner
than he otherwise would have. After the surgery, he worked difficult, strenuous shifts and
further aggravated his condition. Without question, a person injured in tort is required to
take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages, and this, at the very least, includes giving
attention to doctor's orders regarding his course of recovery. In the relevant posture of the
case,the Circuit Court was no doubt obliged to accept that Tanksley had failed in this duty,
that he had in fact aggravated his condition by his own course of conduct. ") (citations
omitted).
130. See, e.g. , Stark, 450 F.2d at 998 ("We think that Shell's proof fell far short of
demonstrating that Stark unreasonably refused to submit to treatment of his back injury.
Even without weighing the seriousness of the operation proposed by Dr. Purvis, there was
no showing that that operation offered a reasonable certainty of correcting the disability.
There was direct medical testimony that it did not. There was also the undisputed evidence
that an identical operation had already been performed with negative results. "); A utomatic
Merchandisers, Inc. , 646 P.2d at 555 ("[A)ppellant failed to present evidence that
respondent's disinclination to undergo surgery was unreasonable. ... [ S)urgery was not even
consistently recommended prior to trial, and neither Ward's treating physician nor
appellant's expert witness recommended surgical intervention by the time of trial, since
respondent's condition had improved with conservative treatment."); Zimmerman, 513 P.2d
at 1171 ("Neither is there any evidence that plaintiff had been advised by any doctor that she
should submit to a surgical operation on her knee and that she then failed or refused to do
so. Indeed, both plaintiff's and defendant's doctors agreed that surgery was not indicated at
the time of their examination. ... No case has been cited to us in which it has been held that
a plaintiff with a torn cartilage in the knee must submit to surgery to remove the damaged
cartilage or be barred,as a matter of law,from seeking damages for an otherwise permanent
injury, at least in the absence of such evidence."); Cox, 935 P.2d at 1380 ("The Keg first
argues that Cox's unreasonable failure to mitigate is demonstrated by his refusal to have his
shunt removed or restructured as recommended by his physiatrist, Dr. Evan Cantini. But
Cantini only testified that he felt that it might have been useful to consider revising or
eliminating the shunt and that he discussed shunt revision as a treatment option.. ..
Moreover, Cantini stated that he was not an expert in evaluating hydrocephalus and
deferred to Cox's neurosurgeon, Dr. Richard Winn, who testified that it was reasonable to
decline a shunt revision. ").
131. See, e.g., Thurman v. Clarke Indus.,Inc.,872 S.W.2d 418,420 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994)
(en bane) (" Section 11-9-512 provides as follows: 'Except in cases of hernia , which are
specifically covered by § 11-9-523, where an injured person unreasonably refuses to submit
to a surgical operation which has been advised by at least two (2) qualified physicians and
where the recommended operation does not involve unreasonable risk of life or additional
serious physical impairment, the Commission, in fixing the amount of compensation, may
take into consideration such refusal to submit to the advised operation."'); Beth-Elkhorn
Corp. v. Epling, 450 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Ky. 1970) ("KR S 342.035(2) provides, so far as
pertinent to this case: 'No compensation shall be payable for the * * * disability of an
employe[e) * * * in so far as his disability is * * " continued, by an unreasonable failure to
submit to or follow any competent surgical treatment or medical aid or advice.' "); Veal v.
Trans Gulf,Inc.,723 So. 2d 987,992 (La. Ct.App.1998) (per curiam) ("Though the claimant
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Social Security disability benefits have held that benefits will be
denied to a claimant with "an impairment that can be remedied by
treatment with reasonable effort and safety."132 Courts interpreting
cannot be forced to submit to surgery, his compensation may be jeopardized if he
unreasonably refuses. "); Gordon v. Me. Reduction Co., 358 A.2d 544, 548 (Me. 1976) (per
curiam) ("We do not doubt that under 39 M.R.S.A. § 65 a claimant's unreasonable refusal to
submit to surgery or any reasonable examination attendant thereto is an affirmative defense
to the employer's obligation to continue to provide compensation benefits ... . ") (footnote
omitted); Jacobs v. Ryder Sys./Complete Auto Transit, 789 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) ("A claimant's refusal to submit to medical treatment bars an award of compensation
only when the refusal is unreasonable."); Yarns v. Leon Plastics, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 801, 804
(Neb. 1991) ("[W]hile a disabled employee may not be required to undergo surgery, an
unreasonable refusal to submit to surgery, taking into account the risk involved to the
employee, the nature of the surgery, and the likelihood of improving the condition, may
result in the forfeiture or reduction of compensation benefits, as may be appropriate."); Saif
Corp. v. Orr, 792 P.2d 454, 456 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) ("A claimant who unreasonably fails or
refuses to mitigate the extent of his permanent disability is not entitled to compensation for
that portion of his disability attributable to the unreasonable failure or refusal."); Am. Red
Cross v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 741 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (" Section
306(f.1)(8) of the Workers' Compensation Act ... provides: 'If the employe[e] shall refuse
reasonable services of health care providers, surgical, medical and hospital services,
treatment, medicines and supplies, he shall forfeit all rights to compensation for any injury
or increase in his incapacity shown to have resulted from such refusal."'); Klein Indus.
Salvage v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 259 N.W.2d 124, 125 (Wis. 1977) (per
curiam) ("Under the Workers' Compensation Act, a claimant may receive reduced benefits
or be denied them altogether if he or she fails to mitigate the damages resulting from a
work-related injury. The statute provides as follows: 'TREATMENT REJECTED BY
EMPLOYE[E]. Unless the employe[e] shall have elected Christian Science treatment ... ,
no compensation shall be payable for the death or disability of an employe[ e], if his death be
caused, or insofar as his disability may be aggravated, caused or continued (a) by an
unreasonable refusal or neglect to submit to or follow any competent and reasonable
medical or surgical treatment ...." ).
'

132. Johnson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 794 F.2d 1106, 1111 (6th Cir. 1986);
see also Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) ("If a symptom
can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling. "); Schena v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 635-F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1980) ('"In determining whether a
claimant's refusal to undergo treatment is reasonable-i. e. supported by justifiable cause
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1507-several factors must be considered.' ... A reasonable fear may
justify the refusal of treatment.") (citation omitted); Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362
(6th Cir. 1978) ("The Secretary's reliance on appellant's refusal to undergo a surgical spinal
fusion does not support a denial of benefits. Appellant's surgeon testified that it was not
unreasonable for his patient to decline to submit to this serious surgery.") (citation omitted);
Nichols v. Califano, 556 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A claimant under a disability need
not submit to all treatment, no matter how painful, dangerous, or uncertain of success,
merely because one physician believes that a remedy may be effective. In determining
whether a claimant's refusal to undergo treatment is reasonable-i. e. , supported by
justifiable cause under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1507-several factors must be considered. ") (citations
omitted); Fessler v. Apfel, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1253 (D. Colo. 1998) ("'If an impairment can
reasonably be treated or controlled it cannot constitute a disability."') (citation omitted);
Valdez v. Heckler, 616 F. Supp. 933, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("Impairments that can be
reasonably remedied by treatment cannot function as the basis for a finding of disability.");
Benedict v. Heckler, 593 F. Supp. 755, 760-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[E]ven if the treatment
were prescribed and would restore plaintiff's ability to work, plaintiff may still refuse such
treatment where justifiable cause exists.... The overwhelming majority of cases in this area
deal with the refusal of surgery. In those cases, doctor's predictions of success, patient's fear
of pain, or fear of the surgery itself and even the doctor-patient relationship are factors to be
considered. The refusal, however, must be reasonable.") (citations omitted); Martin v.
Schweiker, 550 F. Supp. 199, 201 (N.D. Cal. 1982) ("It is well settled that where an
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private disability insurance policies have also found that some policies
either explicitly or implicitly condition benefits on the insured's
pursuit of reasonable mitigation.133
One piece of evidence that fact finders judging the reasonableness
of a plaintiff's actions should consider when it is available is what
other people in the same situation-with the same condition, the same
available mitigating measures, and the same financial resources-have
actually done.134 The more people in the plaintiff's situation who have
mitigated, the stronger the evidence that mitigation is the only
impairment reasonably can be remedied by treatment, it cannot serve as the basis for
disability. "); Holguin v. Harris, 480 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("If an impairment
reasonably can be remedied or controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot serve as a
basis for a finding of disability."); Fletcher v. Califano, 471 F. Supp. 317, 320 (N.D. Tex.
1979) ("If an impairment can reasonably be remedied or controlled by treatment, it cannot
serve as a basis for a finding of disability."); Locklear v. Mathews, 424 F. Supp. 639, 647 (D.
Md. 1976) ('"(I)f an impairment reasonably can be remedied by treatment, it can not serve
as a basis for a finding of disability."') (citation omitted).
133. See, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Henry, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1003(C.D. Cal. 2000) ("On apparent first impression in the Ninth Circuit, the Court holds a
disability insurance policy may condition benefits on the insured's consent to appropriate
medical care, which may include surgery.. . . (T)he appropriate-care provision (in the
disability insurance policy) here creates an explicit duty to seek and accept appropriate
treatment. "); Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 96-3951, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 24, 1997) ("'(P)olicies 335 and 337 ... require that plaintiff be 'receiving care by a
physician which is appropriate for the condition causing the disability' in order to be entitled
to benefits.... 'Appropriate' means suitable under the circumstances. It does not mean
perfect care, or the best possible care. Thus, in order to prove he is entitled to total disability
under policies # 335 and # 337, the plaintiff must also prove that he has received appropriate
care for his allegedly disabling condition."' (quoting jury instructions)); Casson v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 367 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) ("Delaware decisional law is
aligned with the opposite view-that an insured must submit to treatment to which a
reasonably prudent man would ordinarily submit if the disability is correctable. If the
insured fails or refuses to submit to reasonable treatment recommended by competent
physicians, he is precluded from recovery for the disability for the period the cure would
have become effective. .. . I conclude that the duty to minimize a claimed disability is a
condition precedent to Nationwide 's liability under the contract with plaintiff and that such
condition was implied in the policy as a matter of law. ") (citations omitted).
04

134. Reasonableness is a question for the jury or for the judge acting as a finder of fact,
unless no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiffs actions were reasonable. See, e.g.,
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 n.12 (1976) ("(T)he jury's unique
competence in applying the 'reasonable man' standard is thought ordinarily to preclude
summary judgment in negligence cases. "); Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 34
(1st Cir. 2003) ("[Even if the] raw facts are undisputed . .. . the judgment call as to
reasonableness is itself a jury issue unless no reasonable jury could decide it in the plaintiff's
favor. "); King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 259 (2d Cir. 1997) ("(T]he assessment of
reasonableness generally is a factual question to be addressed by the jury."); West v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 868 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam) ("[T]he cases show that
reasonableness becomes a question of law appropriate for determination on motion for
summary judgment when only one conclusion about the conduct's reasonableness is
possible."); Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 703 F.2d 921, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[E)ven
where there is no dispute as to the facts, it is usually for the jury to decide whether the
conduct in question meets the reasonable man standard. Issues that require the
determination of the reasonableness of the acts and conduct of the parties under all the facts
and circumstances of the case, cannot ordinarily be disposed of by summary judgment.")
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

256

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103 :217

reasonable choice. Examining this sort of empirical evidence could
improve consistency between cases and would provide fact finders
with a firm foundation on which to make their judgments of
reasonableness. It would also allow reasonableness to be judged with
some reference to the choices that disabled people themselves have
made.
The record of disabled people's own decisions is a valuable source
of information for at least two reasons. First, disabled people have
strong incentives to seek out and pursue beneficial mitigating
measures. The biological and physical disadvantages that can be
associated with disability are widely (although not universally)135
acknowledged among the disabled. Many disabled people, with a large
variety of disabilities, stress these disadvantages and explain that they
would prefer to be able-bodied for that reason.136 Mitigation can vastly
increase a person's realistic chances of securing employment. It
generally makes people more able to work, and many, if not most,
employers will evaluate employees and job applicants who have
mitigated in their mitigated state. Mitigation also frequently improves
the quality of a disabled person's life outside work. Disabled people,
considered as a group, have powerful motivations to undertake
reasonable mitigation, although any one disabled individual will not
necessarily act reasonably.

135. See supra text accompanying note 19; infra text accompanying notes 140-60.
136. For instance, Martin Milligan, a blind philosopher, explains that: "Certainly, if
doctors said there was now a good chance of restoring my sight by an operation, I would be
actively interested." Letter 4: From Martin Milligan to Bryan Magee, in ON BLINDNESS:
LETTERS BETWEEN B RYAN MAGEE AND MARTIN MILLIGAN 34, 34-36 (1995). Blindness "is
so disadvantaging in such a wide range of frequently encountered circumstances that" it
"would still be a serious handicap even if we blind people constituted the overwhelming
majority of the world's population, and could arrange things to suit ourselves, and could
subject the remaining sighted people to our will." Id. at 38. Bonnie Poitras Tucker, a lawyer
and legclI academic, states that she "would gladly grab any opportunity to fix [her] deafness"
because " [d]eaf people lack one of the five critical senses, plain and simple." BONNIE
POITRAS TuCKER, THE FEEL OF SILENCE, at xix, xxi (1995). Jenny Morris, a disability rights
activist who was paralyzed in an accident, similarly reports "that even if the physical
environment in which I live posed no physical barriers, I would still rather walk than not be
able to walk. However non-discriminatory the society in which I lived, to be able to walk
would give me more choices and experiences than not being able to walk." JENNY MORRIS,
PRIDE AGAINST PREJUDICE: TRANSFORMING ATTITUDES TO DISABILITY 1-2, 71 (1991).
On other disabilities, see JASON KINGSLEY & MITCHELL LEVITZ, COUNT Us IN:
GROWING UP WITH DOWN SYNDROME 35 (1994) ("Mitchell: I wish I didn't have Down
syndrome because I would be a regular person, a regular mainstream normal person.")
(original emphasis omitted); SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 175, 2 (1996) ("I would joyfully accept a cure
[for chronic fatigue immune dysfunction syndrome] if it were offered me . . . . "); Harilyn
Rousso, Fostering Healthy Self Esteem, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Dec. 1984, at 9, 9-10 ("It is
not that I would choose to be disabled [with cerebral palsy] . . . . "); Toombs, supra note 104,
at 19-20 ("Multiple sclerosis is an unlucky break, and I wish I didn't have it . . . . [T]here is
nothing intrinsically good about chronic, progressive multiple sclerosis.").
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Second, evidence about what other disabled people in the same
situation have done can reveal information missing from medical or
other outside expert judgments about the disabled. Studies suggest
that experts do not always accurately understand disabled people. For
instance, a number of studies have found that health care professionals
estimate the quality of their disabled patients' lives to be much lower
than what the patients themselves report, which may lead the
professionals to prescribe too much treatment.137 Using the record of
disabled people's own decisions as evidence in the evaluation of
reasonableness can help counteract this bias.
B.

Two Hard Categories of Cases

The reasonable mitigation standard also provides an appropriate
means of handling two particularly hard categories of cases. The first
involves disabled people who do not want to take a mitigating

137. See, e.g., John R. Bach & Denise I. Campagnolo, Psychosocial Adjustment of Post
Poliomyelitis Ventilator Assisted Individuals, 73 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. &
REHABILITATION 934, 934 (1992) ("The effect of severe disability, tracheostomy, and
ventilator use on psychosocial functioning, gainful employment, life satisfaction, and
perceived well-being were studied for a population of 395 ventilator assisted post
poliomyelitis individuals (PVAis). . . . Two-hundred-seventy-three physically intact health
care professionals served as controls. . . . The controls significantly underestimated the
patients' life satisfaction and well-being scores and significantly overestimated the relative
hardship associated with ventilator use."); John R. Bach & Margaret C. Tilton, Life
Satisfaction and Well-Being Measures in Ventilator Assisted Individuals with Traumatic
Tetraplegia, 75 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 626, 626 (1994) ("This study
evaluates the effect of complete traumatic tetraplegia on the life satisfaction and well-being
of 87 individuals, 42 of whom are ventilator supported, 2 years or more postinjury....
The . . . life satisfaction (of the 'ventilator assisted individuals with tetraplegia') and other
well-being and quality of life indicators were generally positive, and were significantly
underestimated by a control group of health care professionals."); Eugenia Bodenhamer et
al., Staff and Patient Perceptions of the Psychosocial Concerns of Spinal Cord Injured
Persons, 62 AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. 182, 188 (1983) ("[H)ighly significant differences
occurred between staff and (the spinal cord injured (SCI)) patients' responses on the four
scales of Anxiety, Depression, Social Discomfort, and Positive Outlook.... An inspection of
the means indicates the staff tended to overestimate the amount of depression and social
discomfort, and underestimate positive outlook and anxiety."); id. at 191 ("(S)ix of the seven
staff members who were most accurate in their predictions of patient responses were new to
SCI service, having worked only a year or less with spinal cord injured patients."); Laura A.
Cushman & Marcel P. Dijkers, Depressed Mood in Spinal Cord Injured Patients: Staff
Perceptions and Patient Realities, 71 ARCHIVES PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 191,
195 (1990) ("There was . . . a consistent bias on the part of staff to overestimate depressed
mood, relative to the report of [the SCI) patients themselves. This is consistent with the
suggestion that patient behavior is interpreted according to the prevailing professional
ideology; in the case of rehabilitation personnel, this view includes depression as a necessary
phase of adjustment to SCI.") (footnote omitted); Frederick A. Ernst, Contrasting
Perceptions of Distress by Research Personnel and Their Spinal Cord Injured Subjects, 66
AM. J. PHYSICAL MED. 12, 13-14 (1987) ("The results of the present study replicate and
extend those of Bodenhamer, et al. (1983) who reported serious discrepancies in perception
of distress comparing SCI patients and the rehabilitative professionals who treat them....
(O]ur staff overestimated distress on all four of the questionnaire's measures, including
anxiety.").
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measure because of the associated risks or side effects, when those
risks or side effects are serious but ones that a reasonable person in
the same situation would nevertheless assume for the expected
benefit. The second inv·olves the small number of disabled people,
most frequently members of the deaf community, who refuse
mitigation even if a reasonable person in their situation would
undertake it because they believe that their disability is central to their
cultural identity. This Section will explore why these cases raise hard
issues. It concludes, however, that disabled people in each of these
situations should still be subject to the duty of reasonable mitigation,
although courts should consider a plaintiff's interests and claims
carefully before deciding that the plaintiff's decision not to mitigate is
unreasonable.
These categories of cases are difficult because they involve
unreasonable decisions not to mitigate in circumstances where
reasonable mitigation would require especially large sacrifices, at least
from the perspective of the disabled person at issue. Without doubt, a
disabled person can have legitimate concerns about risks or side
effects that he alone will have to bear, and these concerns may be
greatest where the risks or side effects involve serious harm. Imagine,
for instance, the distress that the duty of reasonable mitigation could
cause a disabled person who does not want to undergo mitigating
surgery because he fears the risk of death associated with the use of
anesthesia, when the disabled person knows that a reasonable person
would undergo the surgery because it usually ameliorates the disability
in question and death is very unlikel}' to occur.138 Consider the
dilemma of a person with a serious impaitment who does not want to
take a mitigating medicine because of its cognitive side effects, when a

138. See, e.g. , Yukio Kubota et al., Frequency of Anesthetic Cardiac Arrest and Death in
the Operating Room at a Single General Hospital over a 30-Year Period, 6 J. CLINICAL
ANESTHESIA 227, 230-31 (1994) ("Over the 30 years of this prospective study, 85,708
anesthetics of all kinds were performed in the OR [operating room]. During that time, four
CAs [cardiac arrests] occurred during anesthesia. Thus, the frequency of CAs is estimated to
be 1 in 2 1,427, or 0.5 in 10,000, anesthetics. Three of our patients were successfully
resuscitated, and one died, yielding a mortality rate during anesthesia of 1 in 85,708, or 0.1 in
10,000, anesthetics. Over this 30-year period, there were no surgical deaths due to events
such as massive hemorrhage or surgical mismanagement during anesthesia.") (citations
omitted); Myrna C. Newland et al., Anesthetic-Related Cardiac Arrest and Its Mortality: A
Report Covering 72,959 Anesthetics over JO Years from a US Teaching Hospital, 97
ANESTHESIOLOGY 108, 108 (2002) ("One hundred forty-four cases of cardiac arrest within
24 h of surgery were identified over a 10-yr period from an anesthesia database of 72,959
anesthetics. . . . Fifteen cardiac arrests out of a total number of 144 were judged to be related
to anesthesia. Five cardiac arrests were anesthesia-attributable, resulting in an anesthesia
attributable cardiac arrest rate of 0.69 per 10,000 anesthetics . . . . Ten cardiac arrests were
found to be anesthesia-contributory, resulting in an anesthesia-contributory rate of 1.37 per
10,000 anesthetics . . . . The risk of death related to anesthesia-attributable perioperative
cardiac arrest was 0.55 per 10,000 anesthetics . . . . ).
"
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reasonable person with that impairment would be willing to take the
medicine for its expected benefits. 139
Similarly, even if one has doubts about the wisdom of a disabled
person constructing a disability-based identity for himself, the lives
and public statements of a small number of disabled people do reflect
their commitment to such an identity. These disabled people
frequently express the conviction that they would not change their
disability if they could because it is a significant part of who they are.
For instance, I. King Jordan, the president of Gallaudet University,
which is dedicated to deaf students, 140 has denied that "there [is] a
significant absence when you can't hear" and compared asking a deaf
person if he would like to hear to "ask[ing] a black person, 'Suppose
you could take a pill and become white, would you take it?'"141 Some
disabled people outside the deaf community articulate similar beliefs.
Cyndi Jones, who had polio, has stated that she would not take "a
139. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 85-87, 95, 104.
140. See, e.g. , JOHN B. CHRISTIANSEN & SHARON N. BARNARTI, DEAF PRESIDENT
Now!: THE 1 988 REVOLUTION AT GALLAUDET UNIVERSITY, at vii, 160-63, 194 (1995);
JACK R. GANNON, THE WEEK THE WORLD HEARD GALLAUDET 15, 20, 144 (1989).
141. 60 Minutes: King Jordan (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 1 1 , 1990) (transcript at 14,
on file with author). Oliver Markwirth, who has served as president of the Dallas County
Deaf Caucus, has similarly contended that: '"Trying to make a deaf person hearing is like
telling a black person to change his skin . . . . Why do you want to make all people be the
same?"' Christine Wicker, Sound Barrier: These Deaf People Are Flourishing with Their
Own Culture, Language and Humor. And a Strong Bond in Their Isolation, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 17, 1993, Magazine, at 8, 10. Judith Coryell, who has been head of the
deaf education program at Western Maryland College, has also employed an analogy to race
to describe the importance of deafness to her identity. '"Let me put it this way,"' she has
explained. '"Say you were black. Do you think you'd be considering surgery to make
yourself white?"' Marie Arana-Ward, As Technology Advances, a Bitter Debate Divides the
Deaf, WASH. POST, May 11, 1997, at Al, A20. Along the same lines, Genie Gertz, who
represented New York in a Miss Deaf America contest, has reported that she '"wouldn't
ever change [being deaf]. Why would I?'" Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 45. Clara Gantes, a deaf teacher of sign language, has
stated that she doesn't '"regret being deaf at all and I don't want to leave deaf people. It's a
part of me."' John Barry, Silence Is Golden?, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 22, 1991, Tropic, at 8,
12, 16. Susan Philip, who has been coordinator of deaf services at Northeastern University,
has said that: '"My deafness is normal to me . . . . and I have no interest in an implant."'
Richard Saltus, Some Spurn Implants, Say They Don't Want to A bandon the Deaf Culture,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 1989, at 29, 29; see also BERNARD BRAGG, LESSONS IN
LAUGHTER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A DEAF ACTOR 4 (Eugene Bergman trans., 1989)
("I thought deafness was a way of life and never linked it with sickness, defectiveness, or a
handicapped condition. I thought, and I still do, that my deafness is just part of who I am.");
J. William Evans, Thoughts on the Psychosocial Implications of Cochlear Implantation in
Children, in COCHLEAR IMPLANTS IN YOUNG DEAF CHILDREN 307, 307-08 (Elmer Owens
& Dorcas K. Kessler eds., 1989) ("In an informal survey (Evans, unpublished raw data),
prelingually deafened adults were asked whether they would choose to have an implant if it
were possible that some hearing could be restored. The response was approximately 85
percent negative. The common explanation they offered was that the procedure would be
destructive to their social relationships, to the world that they had come to know, and to
their adaptive mechanisms."); Solomon, supra, at 40 ('"I am black and Deaf and proud and I
don't want to be white or hearing or different in any way from who I am."' (quoting a
student at the Lexington Center for the Deaf)).
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magic pill" that would allow her to walk again, contending that this
question is '"the same thing as asking a black person would he change
the color of his skin."' '"Even if you don't like the way society treats
you as a disabled person, it's part of your experience, it's part of how
you come to be who you are. "'142 Indeed, at least some members of
this group of disabled people, especially the deaf among them, report
that they want their children to share their disability and the
associated cultural identity. Joan Philip Meehan, for example,
"'want[ed] my daughter to be like me, to be deaf."'143 Daniel Smith
and his wife '"were very excited, happy [when their child was born
deaf]. We were thrilled . . . . Doctors thought it would be bad news we had different perspectives. "'144
142. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12, 14 (1993). Nadina LaSpina, who also had polio, has similarly
insisted that she "'would not trade my disability for anything . . . . We will not change to fit
the mold . . . . Instead, we will destroy the mold and change the world to make sure there is
room for everyone."' Douglas Martin, Disability Culture: Eager to Bite the Hands that Would
Feed Them, N.Y. TIMES, June 1 , 1997, § 4, at 1 , 1. Gene Chelberg, who is blind, has
campaigned for the establishment of a cultural center for disabled students at the University
of Minnesota by recounting that: '"For years, we have been asked to live in this able-bodied
world, trying to become able-bodied people. The idea here is, I'm proud of my disability and
I don't need to be fixed."' Cultural Center for the Disabled Prompts Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1992, § 1, at 45, 45. Steven E. Brown, a founder of the Institute on Disability
Culture, has declared that: "'We claim our disabilities with pride as part of our identity. We
are who we are: we are people with disabilities."' Martin, supra, at 1 .
143. Saltus, supra note 1 4 1 , a t 29.
144. Deaf Parents Are Happy When Their Baby ls Born Deaf, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Oct. 11, 1 994, at 3A, 3A. Paula Sargent explains that "'deaf people feel about deaf children
the way Indians feel about Indian children. It's like, 'You're part of us."" Barry, supra note
141, at 13; see also id. at 11 ("'Actually, I wish there were more deaf babies being born,' [sign
language teacher Lynn Frankel] types. 'That's an awful thing to say if you don't understand
my position, but to me a deaf child is a blessing, not a burden, and I am really proud of the
fact that when God was handing out handicaps, I was one of the chosen to get a handicap of
deafness.'"); id. at 12 ("At Gallaudet's genetic counseling center, couples come to find out
how likely it is for deafness to be passed on. What is the 'risk,' some ask, of having hearing
children?"); HARLAN LANE ET AL., A JOURNEY INTO THE DEAF-WORLD 18 (1996) ("'We
were starting on my kids,' said Henry. 'Like Jake's folks, my wife and I weren't expecting
our children to be Deaf because we both have hearing parents and the rest of our extended
families are all hearing. So it was a surprise to us with both kids, but we were thrilled when
we found out. It was pretty confusing for the doctors, let me tell you. The audiologist came
in after the test looking very apprehensive and said, 'I am so sorry. The test shows that your
baby is Deaf, although there may be a chance of residual . . . .' He stopped because my wife
and I were hugging each other, we were so happy. He thought we were nuts.'") (original
emphasis omitted); Abigail Trafford, Controlling Genetic Roulette, WASH. POST, Nov. 15,
1994, Health, at 6, 6 ("'Many of our families are not interested in fixing or curing deaf
genes,' explains genetic counselor Jamie Israel at the genetic services center at Gallaudet.
'Many . . . couples come in and want . . . deaf children."'); Wicker, supra note 141, at 10
("Ross Roeser, director of Dallas' Callier Center for Communication Disorders, gives an
example he hopes will illuminate. 'You know, when we have two parents who are both deaf,'
says Dr. Roeser, who is hearing, 'and we test their baby and the baby turns out to be hearing,
they grieve, just like hearing parents who are told they have a child who is deaf."').
Not surprisingly, surveys consistently find that deaf people generally choose other deaf
people as marriage partners. See, e.g. , JEROME D. SCHEIN & MARCUS T. DELK, JR., THE
DEAF POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 41 (1974) ("In choosing a marital partner,
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In addition, this category of disabled people has a record of
organized resistance to protect their disability-based cultural
identity.145 In March 1988, for instance, deaf students at Gallaudet
University in Washington, D.C. succeeded in closing the school for a
week until the Board of Trustees agreed to appoint the university's
first deaf president, I. King Jordan.146 The students, joined by
thousands of deaf supporters from around the country who staged
rallies in their hometowns and who traveled to Washington to
participate in marches,147 protested that the hearing person that the
trustees had initially chosen as president was not fluent in sign
language and did not understand deaf culture.148 The social life of this
the majority of deaf persons favor deaf partners. Among married deaf persons in the current
[national) survey [of people deaf before age nineteen), most have deaf spouses . . . . The rate
for nonwhite deaf females is nearly the same as for white deaf females: a little over 14
percent having hearing spouses. The overall rates are close to those reported for New York
State and Washington, D.C. Rainer et al. asked their deaf sample about preference for
spouse's hearing; 86 percent expressed a desire for a deaf mate."); John D. Rainer & W.
Edwards Deming, Demographic Aspects: Number, Distribution, Marriage and Fertility
Statistics, in FAMILY AND MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS IN A DEAF POPULATION 13, 13, 17
(John D. Rainer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1969) ("[In a survey 'of literate deaf persons,'] only 5.1 per
cent of women born deaf, and 8.7 per cent of those that became deaf at an early age, were
married to hearing men. The rest had husbands who had been deaf since birth or early
childhood. Almost 30 per cent of the marriages where both partners were born deaf, and
from 14 to 21 per cent of those where only one partner was born deaf, resulted in deaf
children, usually more than one.").
145. This has historically been a crucial marker of the importance of religious identity,
for instance. See, e.g. , Donald A. Erickson, Showdown at an Amish Schoolhouse, in
COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND THE AMISH: THE RIGHT NOT TO BE MODERN 43, 43-48
(Albert N. Keim ed., 1975) (describing organized Amish resistance to efforts to enforce
compulsory schooling laws by removing Amish children from schools run by the Amish).
146. See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT, supra note 140, at vii-viii, 158-63;
supra note 140, at 15, 48, 50, 144.
147. See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT,
GANNON, supra note 140, at 37-38, 94, 109.

GANNON,

supra note 140, at 133, 150-51, 156, 184-85;

148. See CHRISTIANSEN & BARNARTT, supra note 140, at vii-viii, 60, 79-81, 94, 96, 100,
102-04, 129, 133; GANNON, supra note 140, at 15, 109. Inspired by the successful "Deaf
President Now" campaign at Gallaudet, a group of deaf students and alumni from the
Lexington Center for the Deaf in New York City organized a series of demonstrations in
April and May of 1994 that led to the resignation of the center's hearing chief executive
officer and the appointment of Phil Bravin, a leading figure in the deaf community, as
president of the center's board. Solomon, supra note 141, at 40, 42-43; see also David
Firestone, Chief Executive to Step down at Deaf Center, N.Y. DMES, June 22, 1994, at B3,
B3; David Firestone, Deaf Students Protest New School Head, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at
B3, B3. Students at the Wisconsin School for the Deaf closed the school down for two days
in November 1991 until the state agreed to formulate a plan to recruit deaf people for staff
positions at the school and to search for a deaf person to serve as the school's next
superintendent. See Richard L. Kenyon, Sign It Loud: I'm Deaf, and I'm Proud,
MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 5, 1992, Magazine, at 4, 7.
The broader disability culture movement, in turn, has orchestrated repeated, nationwide
protests of the annual Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystrophy Association Telethon, charging that
"its pity approach to fund-raising" contributes to the view that disabled people are
"childlike, helpless, hopeless, nonfunctioning and noncontributing members of society,"
Evan Kemp Jr., Aiding the Disabled: No Pity, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1981, at A19, A19,
"'only worthwhile if we can be cured,"' Greg Lopez, Disabilities Don't Cripple Life, Woman
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category of disabled people also frequently revolves around cultural
institutions focused on a disability-based identity. Many deaf people,
for example, have devoted significant portions of their lives to deaf
clubs.149 There are also deaf arts festivals,150 deaf film festivals,151 deaf
beauty pageants,152 deaf theater companies,153 and deaf plays.154 The
Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 6, 1993, at SA, SA (quoting the organizers of "the first
demonstration in Denver against the telethon"); see also Alexandra M. Biesada, Protesters
Object to 'Jerry's Kid' Image, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 7, 1993, at B2, B2; Katy
Butler, Jerry Lewis Telethon Protested in Oakland, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 1992, at All, All;
Peter Larsen, Annual Telethon Protested: Disabled Call Lewis' Style Demeaning, DAILY
NEWS (Los Angeles), Sept. 7, 1992, at 4-News, 4-News; Holly Yettick, Protesters Arrested at
Telethon, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 4, 2001, at 17A, 17A. This movement has also
held demonstrations that denounce efforts to legalize assisted suicide, arguing that the right
to-die movement is "'promulgating the view that disability is inherently undignified"' so
"that someone who has become disabled might want to have assisted suicide as an option."
Jeanne Malmgren, Promoting Living Despite Disability, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 2S,
1999, at lD, 6D (quoting Diane Coleman, "spokeswoman for Not Dead Yet").

149. One deaf woman, for instance, has explained that her deaf social club in
Philadelphia "'is like [her] home."' As she elaborated, "'for Deaf people the Deaf club is
like a second home. Hearing people don't have anything like that. They go home from work,
put on headphones, and listen to their stereos or watch television. But the Deaf get together
and socialize at their club. It's like a second home.'" Stephanie A. Hall, Door into Deaf
Culture: Folklore in an American Deaf Social Club, 73 SIGN LANGUAGE STU D . 421, 421
(1991). "'The deaf club,"' another deaf person has similarly reported, is "'where the deaf
meet. It's their gathering place, the heart of their world, their ballroom, their bar, their
theater, their co=unity center-all rolled into one."' BRAGG, supra note 141, at 190-91
(quoting Gene Bergman, coauthor of the deaf play Tales from a Clubroom); see also LOU
ANN WALKER, A LOSS FOR WORDS: THE STORY OF DEAFNESS IN A FAMILY 117-18 (1986)
("The network of organizations Morn and Dad belonged to entailed every conceivable
social, intellectual, and athletic function. Obviously, because the deaf population is limited,
many of the clubs in Indianapolis had overlapping memberships, but still, the commitment of
those members was amazing. . . . The clubs held dances, had basketball and softball leagues,
dinners, endless parties and get-togethers. One or several of these groups sponsored nursing
homes and children's camps, provided scholarships, crowned a Miss Deaf Indiana, and
much, much more.").
lSO. See, e.g. , Lynette Clemetson, An International Gathering for the Deaf in the Arts,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at Bl, Bl ("[Willy] Conley, now an actor, playwright and director,
is one of 400 artists - visual, performing and literary - whose works are being featured in
Deaf Way II, an international arts festival and conference that begins today in
Washington . . . . The weeklong extravaganza is said to be the largest event in any country
devoted to deaf issues and the arts. More than 8,SOO people from 108 countries have
registered, and organizers are expecting hundreds more."); id. at BS ("[Gallaudet] university
convened the first Deaf Way conference in 1989, planning for SOO people. More than S,000
showed up.").
lSl. See, e.g. , John Petrakis, Cinema Scoping: A Look at the Local Fests for Nearly
Every Interest, CHI . TR!B., Feb. 22, 2002, § 7A, at 8, 8 ("[The goal of the Festival of Cinema
for the Deaf] is to show movies made by or starring deaf artists, while also presenting
documentaries or fiction films about the deaf experience.").
1S2. See, e.g. , Ray Quintanilla, Beauty Queen Really Signs on with Kids: Deafness Is Not
a Disability, Says Former Miss Deaf America Winner, CHI . TR!B., Sept. 23, 1994, § 2, at 1, 1
("Stephanie Long, 24, . . . just completed a two-year stint as Miss Deaf America . . . . [T]here
will always be a Miss Deaf America, Long said, referring to the pageant that's in its 20th
year."); id. at 1, 8 ("Long told the Parkwood pupils not to look upon deafness as a
disability . . . . 'The only difference between deaf people and everyone else is that deaf people
can't hear,' Long said. 'Don't think of your difference as a weakness,' she said.").
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broader disability culture movement has similarly produced plays, 155
theater companies, 156 performing arts festivals, 157 films, 158 film
festivals,159 and cultural centers in universities.160

153. See, e.g. , HELEN POWERS, S IGNS OF SILENCE: BERNARD BRAGG AND THE
NATIONAL THEATRE OF THE DEAF 1 15-16 (1 972) (describing the founding of the National

Theatre of the Deaf, "the first professional theater made up of deaf performers"); BRAGG,
supra note 141, at 1 1 1, 1 16-17 (same); id. at 191 (describing "the Hughes Memorial Theatre,
Washington's longtime community theater of the deaf').
154. See, e.g. , BERNARD BRAGG & EUGENE BERGMAN, TALES FROM A CLUBROOM, at
xii (1981) ("It is a fact and not puffery that this play, written by the deaf for the deaf, has met
with enthusiastic responses from deaf audiences wherever it was performed. So there must
be something genuine about it-something with which the deaf can identify-and that was
our aim in the first place . . . . As we see it, and as we know other deaf people see it, our play
reflects the vibrant and buoyant life of a close-knit community."); GILBERT C. EASTMAN,
SIGN ME ALICE, at xi (1974) ("In past years the Gallaudet College Theatre has presented
classic or contemporary plays in which the principal characters (antagonists and
protagonists) express their ideas, arguments, and feelings in speeches that must be
translated, and we the deaf don't fully live the parts because they portray the life of the
hearing. Sign Me Alice is about the life of the deaf mingling in the world of the hearing. The
heroine does not ask for pity but for the right to the deafs choice: sign language or any of
the artificial languages that use signs to represent English.").
155. See, e.g., Mike Ervin, The History of Bowling (Oct. 2000) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author); Cheryl Marie Wade, Sassy Girl: Memoirs of a Poster Child Gone Awry
(1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Carrie Sandahl, 7 Plays About Physical
Difference: Facets of the Experience of Disability from the Insiders' Perspective, A M.
THEATRE, Apr. 2001, at 21, 22 ("A growing number of playwrights and performance artists
have given artistic expression to the experiences and culture of disability from an insider's
perspective . . . . [T]hese insider plays consistently challenge notions of physical impairment
as a metaphor for evil, sin, helplessness and psychological trauma or, conversely, innocence
and saintliness . . . . In addition, the characters in these plays cannot be 'reduced' to their
impairments . . . . Unlike those portrayed in TV movies-of-the-week or mainstream films,
these characters are not obsessed with 'overcoming' or 'curing' their conditions, but take
their bodies as givens, exploring the intersection between their subjective and complex
experiences of disability and the larger culture's often objectifying and limiting
perceptions.").
156. See, e.g. , Greg Freeman, Readers Offer Their Favorite "Uniquities" - What's
Special About Living in St. Louis Area, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 28, 2001, at C3, C3
('"The DisAbility Project [is] a project of That Uppity Theatre Company. An ensemble of
disabled and nondisabled adults who range in age from 18-70, we create, perform and tour
innovative, original theatrical material about the culture of disability."' (quoting Joan
Lipkin)); Kathleen Tolan, We Are Not a Metaphor: A Conversation About Representation,
AM . THEATRE, Apr. 2001, at 16, 17-18 ("[T]he disability rights movement and 'crip culture'
are challenging our preconceptions about what it is to be human. . . . Working both inside
and outside traditional theatre institutions, the disability community has nurtured a body of
work devoted to the disability experience. The longest-lived disability-specific group is
Brother Rick Curry's National Theatre Workshop for the Handicapped, which has been in
existence since 1977 and has campuses in Maine and New York City. NTWH offers
professional training and performance opportunities to artists with disabilities. Other
companies have explicitly activist aims: to empower people with disabilities to take control
of their own stories and their own images through performance. Joan Lipkin's DisAbility
Project in St. Louis and Wry Crips, a disabled women's theatre collective in the Bay area, . . .
are two such groups.").
157. See, e.g., Kenny Fries, Introduction, in STARING BACK: THE DISABILITY
1, 9 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) ("In 1994, I was invited to
and participated in the historic 'A Contemporary Chautauqua: Disability and Performance,'
organized by Victoria Ann-Lewis, director of Other Voices, at the Mark Taper Forum in Los
EXPERIENCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT
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In each of these two categories of cases, complying with the duty of
reasonable mitigation could require plaintiffs to make particularly
large sacrifices, at least from the plaintiff's own perspective.
Nonetheless, I would still apply the duty of reasonable mitigation to
these difficult cases. The same arguments for imposing a duty to
mitigate on other plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title I's
reasonable accommodation prov1s1on hold here as well. The
employers or prospective employers of the plaintiffs in the two
difficult categories of cases have a legitimate interest in minimizing the
costs associated with accommodation if mitigation is possible and
reasonable for the plaintiffs to undertake. These plaintiffs should also
not be able to avail themselves of Title l's reasonable accommodation
provision because they have chosen not to mitigate when mitigation
would be reasonable.
Moreover, creating a separate standard, outside of the reasonable
mitigation standard, to govern these two difficult categories of cases
would produce endless disputes and an extensive collateral
jurisprudence about when each of the two standards should apply.
Some tort cases, for example, hold that a plaintiff disabled by tort
need not mitigate when the associated risks or side effects are
Angeles. That April weekend, prominent artists with disabilities gathered from all across the
United States to perform, read, teach, learn, talk, and get to know one another. That we had
something valuable to offer was evidenced not only by an audience hungry to share our
work, not only by the overcrowded classes, the sold-out performances, the TV camera crews
from CNN and WNET, but also by the lasting nurturing relationships forged by many of the
participant artists.").
158. See, e.g. , Neal Karlen, No Ordinary Inspirational 'Cripple Story, ' N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1995, § 2, at 20, 20 ('"When Billy Broke His Head' is more a disabled version of 'On the
Road,' with [Billy] Golfus as Jack Kerouac's Sal Paradise. Beginning at a fiery disability
rights demonstration in Chicago, he wends his way to California and back to Minnesota to
visit the blind, the bent and the paralyzed, people trying to get by amid social stigmas and
government neglect. Also woven into the narrative are what he sees as patronizing images of
the disabled: Jerry Lewis crooning to wheelchair-bound children at a Labor Day telethon,
Lon Chaney eating the scenery in 'The Hunchback of Notre Dame."').
159. See, e.g. , Elizabeth Lenhard, Disability Film Fest Tries to Even Playing Field,
ATLA NTA CONST., Aug. 14, 1996, at D2, D2 ("Miramar's Disability Film Festival, created at
the behest of the Third Paralympic Congress, won't look back at cinema's bitter paraplegics
and blind damsels in distress. Instead, it will introduce dozens of new films - everything
from slick, feature-length documentaries bound for television networks to rough-edged two
minute shorts to public service announcements - that affirm the disability experience and
reveal corners of the culture.").
160. See, e.g., Meg McSherry Breslin, Anna Stonum, 40, Activist for Disabled, CHI.
Feb. 13, 1999, § 1, at 23, 23 (discussing "the Disability Arts and Culture Center at the
University of Illinois"); Dianne B. Piastro, Rejecting the Role of the Victim, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), July 13, 1993, at 9E, 9E ("As more and more disabled people discard the roles
of isolated victims, and reflect pride in their shared experience, disability culture will simply
become accepted as an integral part of the cultural diversity of this country. Toward this
goal, an exciting gathering of student leaders with disabilities from college campuses around
the country is being convened . . . . Hosted by the Disabled Student Cultural Center at the
University of Minnesota, this precedent-setting conference will explore disability culture and
pride."); supra note 142.
TRIB.,
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particularly serious, even if a reasonable person in the same situation
would mitigate.161 This jurisprudence quickly demonstrates, however,
that there is no obvious or widely accepted way to judge when risks or
side effects are particularly serious. Minnesota, for instance, originally
exempted people disabled by torts from a duty of reasonable
mitigation if the mitigation involved "a major surgical operation. " 162
But the state supreme court dropped this exception in 1973, after
recognizing "that the term 'major surgery' as used in [the state's jury]
instruction [was] too indefinite. " 163 The judiciary has even less
expertise or experience in determining whether a disability is central
to a plaintiff's cultural identity.
Yet these two hard categories of cases do suggest that courts need
to proceed carefully before deciding that a Title I plaintiff's decision
not to mitigate is unreasonable. As noted above, for example,
empirical evidence about what other disabled people in the same
situation have done should be relevant in judging reasonableness. It
gives fact finders a solid foundation from which to work in deciding
hard cases. The greater the percentage of disabled people in the
plaintiff's situation who have mitigated, the more likely it is that
mitigation is the only reasonable choice.164 At the same time, decisions
by a majority of people in the same situation to mitigate do not always
mean that the people who have made the other choice are
unreasonable. In some situations, the sacrifice that mitigation would
demand from a plaintiff may be great enough, or the costs and benefits
of mitigation so closely matched, that decisions both in favor and
against mitigation are reasonable, even though a majority of people in
the situation choose to mitigate. Courts, accordingly, should not
automatically and mechanically equate reasonableness with majority
rule. Instead, courts should appraise the reasonableness of a plaintiff's
decision against mitigation carefully, considering to the extent possible
why people in the plaintiff's situation have or have not mitigated and
161. See, e.g., McDonnell v. McPartlin, 708 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) ("Illinois
law is clear: a plaintiff has no duty to mitigate his damages by submitting to serious or major
surgery."); Hall v. Durnitru, 620 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("[T]he rule regarding
mitigation of damages in relation to suggested medical treatment is as follows: A patient has
a duty to submit to reasonable medical care and treatment intended to improve the patient's
condition and reduce or eliminate the consequences of the defendant's tortious act . . . . An
exception to this general rule exists with respect to surgical procedures as well as nonsurgical
procedures which present a risk of enhanced or additional injury.").
162. Couture v. Novotny, 211 N.W.2d 172, 174-75 (Minn. 1973).
163. Id. at 176; see also id. ("We . . . direct that the following instruction, at least in
substance, be used in this case: If you find that the injuries suffered by Couture can be
alleviated by a surgical operation and that a reasonably prudent person would undergo such
an operation, under all of the circumstances in this case, then such a finding should be taken
into consideration by you as a factor which would reduce the amount of damages to which
Couture would otherwise be entitled.").
164. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
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not just how many people have made each choice. This somewhat
more flexible approach could do much more to recognize plaintiffs'
legitimate interests, justifying its somewhat higher demands on fact
finders.165 In this way, courts applying a reasonable mitigation
standard in Title I suits can appropriately adjudicate and resolve both
the vast bulk of cases in which the plaintiff has not mitigated, and two
particularly difficult categories of cases as well.
Ill. PROTECTION FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE MITIGATED
The case for imposing a duty to mitigate on plaintiffs seeking the
protection of Title I's reasonable accommodation provision does not
depend on whether Sutton's rulings about the status of plaintiffs who
have mitigated remain in force or are legislatively overridden. But this
Part briefly reexamines the legal rights of mitigators in light of the
proposed duty of reasonable mitigation. Under Sutton, only two
groups of mitigators are protected under Title I. The first group
consists of mitigators who are still substantially limited in a major life
activity after mitigating. They count as "disabled" people under
Sutton.166 The second group consists of mitigators who are not
substantially limited after mitigation, but who suffer an adverse
employment action because an employer thinks that they have an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. These
plaintiffs count as "regarded as" disabled people under Sutton.167 Both
of these groups of mitigators merit Title I protection. The plaintiffs in
the first situation have complied with the duty to mitigate, yet remain
disabled and in potential need of accommodation, and the employers'
intentions and motivations in the second situation are exactly the sort
that Title I seeks to regulate. This Part argues, however, that Sutton's
definition of "regarded as" disabled persons should be expanded to
include two more classes of mitigators who are not substantially
limited after mitigation: people who suffer an adverse employment
action because they had to mitigate and people who suffer an adverse
employment action because of the (non-substantially-limiting) side
effects of the mitigation.

165. For some leading examples from the extensive debate over the relative advantages
of rules and standards, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN L IFE
104 & n.35 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 559-68 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685-1713 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379, 379-90 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-95 (1992).
166. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
167. See id. at 489; see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22
(1999).
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Identifying these two classes of mitigators as people who are
"regarded as" disabled would protect them from intentional
discrimination. Stated more precisely, it would mean that if these
mitigators "can perform the essential functions of the employment
position," they cannot legally be denied a job because they had to
mitigate or because they have non-substantially-limiting side effects
from mitigation.168 This protection would advance what Title I
recognizes as legitimate interests, while infringing upon none of the
legitimate interests of employers. These plaintiffs should be
considered "regarded as" disabled rather than disabled people,
however, because they no longer have actual substantial limitations.
For the same reason, they should not have a right to reasonable
accommodation. The case law is currently divided on whether
"regarded as" disabled plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable
accommodation.169 But the majority of courts that have found no
accommodation right for "regarded as" disabled plaintiffs have the
better argument.170 Although Title I's text does not indicate that
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (2000).
169. For decisions holding that Title I plaintiffs who are "regarded as" disabled are not
entitled to reasonable accommodations, see cases cited infra note 170. For decisions holding
or suggesting that Title I plaintiffs who are "regarded as" disabled are entitled to reasonable
accommodations, see Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751 , 774 (3d Cir.
2004) ("While we do not rule out the possibility that there may be situations in which
applying the reasonable accommodation requirement in favor of a 'regarded as' disabled
employee would produce 'bizarre results,' we perceive no basis for an across-the-board
refusal to apply the ADA in accordance with the plain meaning of its text. Here, and in what
seem to us to be at least the vast majority of cases, a literal reading of the Act will not
produce such results. Accordingly, we will remain faithful to its directive in this case."); Katz
v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that whether "regarded as"
disabled plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodations was an
issue for the jury); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 163, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
("The Court disagrees with Weber and a11 the other courts that have held that reasonable
accommodations should not be available where a plaintiff is 'regarded as' disabled. The
Court's conclusion is driven by a number of considerations: (1) the plain language of the
ADA; (2) the legislative history behind the 'regarded as' prong; (3) the mandatory
interactive process, as referenced in Jewell, and (4) the Court's critiques of Weber's
underlying rationale.").
170. See Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2003) ("If
we were to conclude that 'regarded as' plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodation,
impaired employees would be better off under the statute if their employers treated them as
disabled even if they were not. This would be a perverse and troubling result under a statute
aimed at decreasing 'stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
[people with disabilities].' . . . To require accommodation for those not truly disabled would
[also] compel employers to waste resources unnecessarily, when the employers' limited
resources would be better spent assisting those persons who are actua11y disabled and in
genuine need of accommodation to perform to their potential. . . . [W]e hold that there is no
duty to accommodate an employee in an 'as regarded' case.") (citation omitted); Weber v.
Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Imposing liability on employers who fail
to accommodate non-disabled employees who are simply regarded as disabled would lead to
bizarre results . . . . The ADA cannot reasonably have been intended to create a disparity in
treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the right to
reasonable accommodations but granting to others, because of their employers'
misperceptions, a right to reasonable accommodations no more limited than those afforded
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"regarded as" disabled people are to be treated differently than
disabled people, the motivating logic behind the reasonable
accommodation provision is that accommodations are a way of
restructuring jobs to take account of a person's substantial limitations.
People without actual substantial limitations have no need for
reasonable accommodations. People who are discriminated against
because they had to mitigate or because of the non-substantially
limiting side effects of the mitigation do, however, have a strong case
for protection from intentional discrimination. Consider each of these
two classes of mitigators in turn.
Begin with the situation of a plaintiff who is no longer substantially
limited after mitigating, but is denied employment because he had to
mitigate. The myopic Sutton plaintiffs fit into this category. Their
eyesight was no longer substantially limited when they wore corrective
lenses, but United Airlines would not hire them because they needed
to mitigate by wearing the lenses.171 Another potential example might
involve a manic depressive who is no longer substantially limited when
he takes lithium, but is denied employment because he needs to
mitigate by consuming the lithium.
It would be impossible to predict all of the reasons why an
employer might refuse to hire this class of job applicants because they
had to mitigate, but four possibilities are apparent. First, an employer
may harbor something like pure prejudice against disabled people or
people that the employer associates with disability. An employer may
fear or loathe people with manic depression, for instance, no matter
what they do to mitigate. Second, an employer may have unfounded
doubts about the effectiveness of an applicant's mitigation. The
employer may not actually think that the applicant remains
substantially limited, which would allow the applicant to be protected
under Sutton's narrow definition of "regarded as" disabled.172 But the
employer may be convinced without reason that the applicant has
some lesser, yet still disqualifying, limitation. For example, an
employer may not believe how effective lithium is at controlling manic

actually disabled employees. Accordingly, we hold that 'regarded as' disabled plaintiffs are
not entitled to reasonable accommodations . . . . "); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460,
467 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Under the third prong, 'regarded as' having a disability, the defendant
correctly contends that a finding on this basis would obviate the Company's obligation to
reasonably accommodate Workman."); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280
(5th Cir. 1998) ("[A]n employer need not provide reasonable accommodation to an
employee who does not suffer from a substantially limiting impairment merely because the
employer thinks the employee has such an impairment."); Cebertowicz v. Motorola, Inc., 178
F: Supp. 2d 949, 953-54 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("[T]his Court joins those courts that have held an
employer has no duty under the [ADA] to provide a viewed-as-disabled (but not actually
disabled) employee with any accommodation.") (citations omitted).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
172. See supra text accompanying note 167.
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depression, or how much corrective lenses can improve someone's
ability to see. Third, an employer may not trust the applicant to
continue to mitigate, in circumstances where mitigation requires
efforts that are ongoing (like the daily consumption of medicine or the
daily use of corrective lenses) rather than singular (like surgery). If the
applicant decides to stop mitigating, and thereby fails to satisfy his
duty of reasonable mitigation, he would no longer be protected under
Title I and could legitimately be denied employment. But the
employer may believe that this is inadequate protection with respect
to a particular job or applicant. For instance, United Airlines might
not want to hire manic depressive pilots who mitigate with lithium
because of the importance of airplane safety and the risk that the
airline will not be able to detect immediately whether the pilots have
decided to stop taking lithium. Fourth, an employer may fear that a
presently effective mitigating measure will fail at an inopportune
moment for reasons beyond the applicant's control. United Airlines,
for example, might believe that the Sutton plaintiffs have no
substantial limitations when they wear corrective lenses, but worry
that the plaintiffs' lenses could be lost or broken in an emergency.
An employer's first two possible reasons for refusing to hire an
applicant because he had to mitigate would be prohibited if the
applicant was protected as a "regarded as" disabled person. But an
employer has no legitimate interest under Title I in taking adverse
employment actions for those reasons, and including the applicant in
these situations within the protection of Title I would advance
legitimate interests under the statute. First, employers have no
legitimate interest under Title I in acting out of pure animus toward
disability. Indeed, one of Title I's goals is to combat fear and loathing
of the disabled.173 Second, employers have no legitimate interest under
Title I in acting on baseless doubts about whether mitigation can be
effective. To the contrary, one of the core premises behind imposing a
duty to mitigate has to be the conviction that mitigation can materially
lessen or eliminate disabilities in some situations.
Moreover, recognizing plaintiffs who are discriminated against
because they had to mitigate as "regarded as" disabled people would
still protect the legitimate interests of employers. As a preliminary
matter, an employer's legitimate interest in minimizing the cost that
can be associated with providing accommodations is not at stake here.
These plaintiffs no longer need accommodation because they have
complied with the duty to mitigate. In addition, employers would
remain free to refuse employment to people who actually cannot
perform a job because they had to mitigate. Recall that Title I defines
the "qualified" people who are entitled to protection from intentional

173. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12112(a).
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employment discrimination as people who "can perform the essential
functions of the employment position."174 In most cases, the fact that
an applicant has mitigated will not prevent her from performing the
essential functions of a job. The fact that a myopic person depends on
corrective lenses that may break, for instance, does not plausibly
disqualify that person from office work because the lenses can be
easily replaced with little disruption for the employer. But in some
cases the fact of mitigation will make someone unable to perform the
essential functions of the job, and an employer would then be free to
deny the applicant work for that reason. Myopic pilots who mitigate
with corrective lenses or manic depressive pilots who mitigate with
lithium, for instance, might very well be unable to establish that they
can perform the essential functions of a pilot's job, given the
importance that j ob places on maintaining extremely high safety levels
and constant preparedness.
Tum to the situation of a plaintiff who is no longer substantially
limited in any major life activity after mitigating, but is denied
employment because of a non-substantially-limiting side effect of the
mitigation. Imagine, for example, a job applicant who mitigates her
disability by taking a medicine that leaves her with no substantial
limitations, but has the side effect of producing a modest weight gain
(which is not, of course, considered a disability itself).175 An employer
refuses to hire the applicant because of her weight gain, although it
does not believe that the applicant is substantially limited in a major
life activity.
Here, too, protecting this applicant as a "regarded as" disabled
person would advance legitimate interests under the statute. Suppose,
for instance, that the employer has refused to hire the job applicant
with a side effect of modest weight gain because the employer simply
dislikes overweight people. Title I is not concerned about protecting
the modestly overweight in general, but this job applicant's weight
gain is tied to what the duty to mitigate recognizes as important
interests under the statute. One of the premises of a duty of
reasonable mitigation is that side effects can be an inherent part of
mitigation that is worth undertaking. This duty would require a job

174. Id. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a).
175. See, e.g. , Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The allegations,
which we take as true, establish only that the officers have certain physical characteristics
either being marginally above a weight limit or marginally below a fitness standard which
Ohio has deemed inconsistent with the job requirements of certain law enforcement
positions . . . . We thus find that Ohio is entitled to its motion to dismiss."); Murray v. John
D. Archbold Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 1999) ("Exceeding the
boundaries of Defendants' weight policy is no disability at all because the policy drew the
line at figures which would exceed the maximum desirable weight of large-framed men and
women plus 30% of that weight, figures that are well below the measures for morbid
obesity.").
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applicant to assume side effects, as long as they are side effects that a
reasonable person in the same situation would assume. Denying this
applicant Title I protection can function in a way that treats the
benefits of mitigation and the associated side effects as separate
phenomena, leaving the applicant vulnerable to adverse employment
decisions based on those side effects. Protecting a job applicant or
employee from employment discrimination based on the side effects
of mitigation, like weight gain, would recognize that these side effects
are inextricably linked to the fact that the person is mitigating, and the
fact that she is mitigating is inextricably linked to both the substantial
personal benefits of mitigation and the duty to mitigat.e that I advocate
imposing.
An employer's legitimate interests are safeguarded, moreover. An
employer is not required to provide someone who has non
substantially-limiting side effects with reasonable accommodations,
even if the person counts as "regarded as" disabled, and an employer
has to hire only those people who can perform the essential functions
of the job. In most cases, a modest weight gain will not disqualify
someone from performing a job, but in some cases it might. So, for
instance, a fashion company would still be able to refuse modeling
work to an applicant with a modest weight gain if that weight gain
made the applicant unqualified for modeling work. A factory would
still be able to refuse work as a machine operator to an applicant with
a modest weight gain if that weight gain made the applicant unable to
operate the factory's machines at the required rate. Classifying
plaintiffs who are discriminated against because they had to mitigate
or because they have non-substantially-limiting side effects from
mitigation as "regarded as" disabled persons would advance legitimate
interests under Title I, without infringing upon the legitimate interests
of employers.
IV.

THE DUTY TO MITIGATE AND AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN TITLE I AND TITLE VII

Thus far, I have considered the case for imposing a duty of
reasonable mitigation on people seeking the protection of Title l's
accommodation provision, and examined the rights of mitigators in
light of that duty. This final Part of the Article uses the duty to
mitigate issue to illuminate an important difference between Title l's
accommodation provision and the prohibition on intentional
discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans
employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. "176 It argues that Title VII should not require

176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
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mitigation. In some contexts, as with Title I's reasonable
accommodation provision, imposing a duty to mitigate can serve
legitimate interests under a statute. But placing a duty to mitigate on
Title VII plaintiffs-which the Title VII jurisprudence officially does
not do but arguably might be doing indirectly-would not serve what
Title VII recognizes as legitimate interests. Instead, it would allow
employers to avoid costs that reflect the very sort of prejudice that
Title VII seeks to disestablish.
Title l's reasonable accommodation provision and Title VII's
intentional discrimination prohibition attach different moral or
normative weight to the costs that they place on employers. As we
have seen, Title l's reasonable accommodation provision recognizes
that employers have a legitimate interest in minimizing the costs
associated with providing accommodation, and this is a powerful
reason for imposing a duty to mitigate on people seeking
accommodation under Title 1.177 In contrast, however, Title VII
operates on the assumption that the costs placed on employers who
must hire regardless of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin
give employers no legitimate ground for complaint, because these
costs reflect Title VII's central moral and normative goals. Title VII
may force employers to alienate prejudiced customers and coworkers
by adopting nondiscriminatory hiring policies,178 but the statute is
meant to combat rather than indulge that type of prejudice. As one
court deciding a sex discrimination claim under Title VII noted, for
example, "it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the
preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the
sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these
very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome."179 Similarly, Title
VII may prohibit employers from acting based on statistically accurate
generalizations about a protected class,180 but the Title VII
jurisprudence also identifies these generalizations as a form of
impermissible bias. As the Supreme Court has explained, " [e]ven a
true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for
disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply."181 " [T]he basic policy of [Title VII] requires that we focus on
fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes. Practices that
classify employees in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve

177. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
178. See supra text accompanying note 26.
179. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
180. See supra text accompanying note 27.
181. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
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traditional assumptions about groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny
of individuals."182
Phrased another way, Title I's reasonable accommodation
provision recognizes that an employer does have a legitimate reason
to prefer an employee or j ob applicant who needs less
accommodation, or no accommodation. But Title VIl's prohibition on
intentional discrimination operates on the premise that it is
illegitimate for an employer to prefer an employee or job applicant
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The only
exception Title VII makes is for those rare situations in which religion,
sex, or national origin is a "bona fide occupational qualification," and
this a very narrow exception that does not accept cost as a permissible
reason for refusing to employ a protected person.183
In this light, it is clear why Title VII plaintiffs should not be
obligated to mitigate their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
In the context of Title VII, mitigating a plaintiff's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin would mean respecting employer interests that
the statute understands to be illegitimate. Indeed, the reasons for not
imposing a duty to mitigate under Title VII are very similar to the
reasons for not imposing a duty to mitigate on a Title I plaintiff where
mitigation could not decrease the plaintiff's need for accommodation.
As explained above, only mitigation that could diminish a Title I
plaintiff's accommodation requirements could serve an employer's
legitimate interest under Title I in minimizing the cost of the
accommodations that the employer provides.184 Employers have no
legitimate interest under Title I in being able to discriminate against a
disabled person because he is disabled, when the disabled person can
perform the job in question as it is currently structured without
accommodation. Stated more generally, mitigation is only appropriate
when it is serving legitimate interests under the statute. It is not
appropriate when it would enable employers to avoid costs that reflect
the very sort of bias that the statute seeks to combat.
182 Id. at 709.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. The congressmen who enacted Title VII's
"BFOQ" exception explained that it would, for example, permit a Jewish congregation to
hire "Jewish cantors and rabbis," 110 CONG. REC. 2559 (1964) (statement of Rep. Corman),
"an elderly woman" to hire "a female nurse," id. at 2718 (statement of Rep. Goodell), and
"a French restaurant" to hire "a French cook," id. at 7213 ("INTERPRETATIVE
MEMORANDUM OF TITLE VII OF H.R. 7152 SUBMITTED JOINTLY BY SENATOR JOSEPH S.
CLARK AND SENATOR CLIFFORD P. CASE, FLOOR MANAGERS" ) ; see also id. at 2549
(statement of Rep. Rodino) ("[N]ational origin in the operation of a specialty restaurant
such as a French restaurant or Italian restaurant could properly be an occupational
qualification that is reasonably necessary to the operation of the restaurant business."); id. at
13,170 (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("[I]t would not constitute an unlawful employment practice
to hire a person of a particular religion, sex, or national origin in those limited circumstances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification. For example,
an Italian chef could be employed for an Italian restaurant.").
184. See supra Part II.
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As a formal matter at least, Title VII conforms to this insight. It
officially imposes no duty to mitigate on the plaintiffs seeking its
protection. To some extent, the absence of a duty to mitigate under
Title VII may simply reflect the difficulty of changing the
characteristics that Title VII protects: race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin. But this explanation is insufficient. Most notably, a
person experiencing employment discrimination because of his
religion could change his religion by converting.185 If Title VII
plaintiffs are not expected to convert, it is presumably because doing
so would mean respecting the religious prejudices that the statute is
designed to counter.
At the same time, aspects of Title VIl's jurisprudence may
arguably be imposing a duty to mitigate unofficially and as a matter of
practice. Indeed, a longstanding debate in the Title VII case law and
commentary can be usefully reconceived as a debate about mitigation
and about whether Title VII jurisprudence currently imposes a duty to
mitigate.
At the moment, the debate about which employment policies
should count as policies that discriminate based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin is framed around the question of how
Title VII's protected classes are best defined. Title VII itself does not
specify what it means by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
and courts and commentators have disputed which definitions are
most appropriate. For example, some courts contend that Title VII's
prohibition on "sex" discrimination only reaches policies that penalize
applicants or employees because of their biological sex (i.e., because
of the fact that the applicant or employee is a woman or a man).186
Other courts and commentators insist that Title VII's prohibition on
"sex" discrimination should also be interpreted to reach policies that
penalize applicants or employees because they do not conform to
societal expectations about how women or men are supposed to act.187
185. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Religion is, of
course, a forbidden criterion [under Title VII], even though a matter of individual choice.").
186. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1376-77, 1379 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a requirement that employees conform to "the 'Brooks Brothers look,"' by
dressing conservatively, wearing their hair up, and avoiding excessive makeup, is not an
employment requirement based on sex under Title VII); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569
F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that discrimination based on a male job applicant's
effeminacy is not sex-based discrimination under Title VII); Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1086-88, 1091-93 (5th Cir. 1975) (en bane) (holding that a rule
prohibiting male employees from having long hair is not a sex-based rule under Title VII);
Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1389-92 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that a
rule prohibiting female employees from wearing pants is not a sex-based rule under Title
VII).
187. For the most important articulation of this view, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."); see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters.,

November 2004]

Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act

275

Similarly, some courts have suggested that Title VII's prohibition on
"race" discrimination only reaches policies that penalize applicants or
employees for being a member of a particular race,188 and some
commentators have argued that Title VII's "race" discrimination
prohibition should also be interpreted to reach an employment policy
that penalizes applicants or employees who wear their hair in
cornrows.189 Some Title VII decisions indicate that Title VIl's
prohibition on "national origin" discrimination only reaches policies
that penalize applicants or employees for hailing from a foreign
country,190 and some courts and commentators have maintained that
Title VIl's prohibition on "national origin" discrimination should also
be interpreted to reach some employment policies that penalize

Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII to
the extent it occurs 'because of the plaintiff's sex. Sanchez asserts that the verbal abuse at
issue was based upon the perception that he is effeminate and, therefore, occurred because
of sex. In short, Sanchez contends that he was harassed because he failed to conform to a
male stereotype. Sanchez's theory derives from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which the
Supreme Court held that a woman who was denied partnership in an accounting firm
because she did not match a sex stereotype had an actionable claim under Title VIL . . .
Sanchez contends that the holding in Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man
who is discriminated against for acting too feminine. We agree.") (citations omitted);
Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2559-60 (1994)
("Courts that decline to accept preemptive approaches to dress and appearance restrictions
based on judgments about their triviality must face the question whether such restrictions
discriminate 'on the basis of sex.' . . . In addressing the question, however, courts again have
tended to apply highly formal reasoning that accepts and builds upon prevailing community
norms rather than challenging them."); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from
Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995) ("I argue that, at least under Title VII, the existing statutory language
and doctrinal categories, if correctly applied, already provide the necessary protection to
both effeminate men and feminine women, as well as their masculine counterparts.").
188. See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that a rule prohibiting employees from wearing their hair in cornrows is not a race
based rule under Title VII).
189. See, e.g. , Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 366 ("The case of Rogers v. American Airlines upheld
the right of employers to prohibit categorically the wearing of braided hairstyles in the
workplace. The plaintiff, a black woman, argued that American Airline's policy
discriminated against her specifically as a black woman. In effect, she based her claim on the
interactive effects of racial and gender discrimination. The court chose, however, to base its
decision principally on distinctions between biological and cultural conceptions of race.
More importantly, it treated the plaintiff's claims of race and gender discrimination in the
alternative and independent of each other, thus denying any interactive relationship between
the two.") (footnote omitted).
190. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1973) ("This case involves
interpretation of the phrase 'national origin' in Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .
The Court of Appeals . . . conclud[ed] that the statutory phrase 'national origin' did not
embrace citizenship. We . . . affirm. . . . The term 'national origin' on its face refers to the
country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her
ancestors came.'') (citation omitted); id. at 95 ("[N]othing in the Act makes it illegal to
discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage.").
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applicants or employees for speaking with a foreign accent.191 This
Article is not the place for an evaluation of the merits of these
arguments as a matter of interpreting Title VII, but the duty to
mitigate issue discussed here provides a new way to understand what
is at stake in this debate.
The dispute now framed in terms of the appropriate definition of
Title VII's protected classes can also be understood-perhaps more
deeply-as a debate about mitigation. The courts and commentators
who believe that some of the Title VII case law has defined the Title
VII protected classes too narrowly can be understood as arguing that
this case law has functioned to impose a duty to mitigate on Title VII
plaintiffs, by requiring them to change or lessen aspects of themselves
that are part of their protected characteristics. The courts that define
the meaning of the Title VII classes more strictly can be understood as
contending that their Title VII jurisprudence imposes no duty to
mitigate, because it does not require an employee or applicant to
change anything that should count as part of a protected characteristic.
The unspoken premise that underlies both sides of this argument is
that if expectations of feminine behavior from women are part of what
"sex" means, and if wearing one's hair in certain styles is part of what
"race" means, and if having a foreign accent is part of what "national
origin" means, then an employee or applicant should not have to
change those aspects of himself in order to secure protection under
Title VII. Courts and commentators may dispute whether Title VII's
case law currently imposes a duty to mitigate, but both sides of this
debate implicitly agree that Title VII should not impose such a duty.
Title VII plaintiffs should not have to change their protected
characteristics, or lessen the impact of their protected characteristics,
because such a mitigation requirement would serve to respect the very
prejudices that Title VII seeks to contest. As our exploration of the
duty to mitigate issue under Title I illustrates, imposing a duty to
mitigate is only appropriate when it serves legitimate interests under
the operative statute.

191. See, e.g. , Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that accent discrimination can constitute national origin discrimination under Title
VII when the plaintiffs accent does not "interfereO materially with job performance"); Mari
J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1367-68 (1991) (arguing that courts deciding
whether an instance of accent discrimination constitutes discrimination under Title VII
"should consider four separate questions": "1. What level of communication is required for
the job? 2. Was the candidate's speech fairly evaluated? 3. Is the candidate intelligible to the
pool of relevant, nonprejudiced listeners, such that job performance is not unreasonably
impeded? 4. What accommodations are reasonable given the job and any limitations in
intelligibility?").

November 2004)

Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act

277

CONCLUSION

The question of whether plaintiffs seeking the protection of Title
I's reasonable accommodation provision should be under a duty to
mitigate is important doctrinally, and it will have to be decided. But
the issue of mitigation also helps cast light on Title I's reasonable
accommodation provision, and a crucial difference between that
provision and Title VII's prohibition on intentional discrimination.
Mitigation involves not only questions of costs and the interests of
employers versus employees and job applicants. At its core, it is about
which costs and which interests an antidiscrimination statute
recognizes as legitimate concerns, which interests the statute identifies
as merely a form of bias, and which costs the statute is willing to
impose as part of the price for combating discrimination.

